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I. ABSTRACT 
Google distributes proprietary applications for its open-source Android mobile 
operating system (OS) free of charge.  Some of those applications (apps) are 
offered together as a suite of apps known as Google Mobile Services (GMS). 
Manufacturers of mobile devices can agree, pursuant to Google’s Mobile 
Application Distribution Agreement (MADA), to install the suite of apps on their 
devices at a price of zero.  Some theorize that Google’s policy of offering some 
applications together as a suite of apps harms competitors or menaces consumer 
welfare.  In April 2015, the European Commission expressed such concerns when
it initiated a formal antitrust investigation that will scrutinize Google’s licensing
practice with respect to Android, mobile apps, and mobile services.  In April
2014, an antitrust class-action complaint filed against Google by individual 
mobile device owners in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California presented similar allegations.  However, the theory that the MADA’s 
requirements have anticompetitive effects is wrong.  As a matter of economics, 
Google’s practice of distributing free mobile apps in the GMS suite benefits
consumers—as well as manufacturers, mobile carriers, app developers, and
advertisers—by stimulating demand, by reducing the risk of fragmentation of the 
Android OS, and by preventing Google’s competitors from free riding on its
investment to make the Android OS and mobile apps a viable open-source 
competitor to closed and proprietary—walled garden—platforms for mobile 
larger whole—GMS—is lawful under the Supreme Court’s four-part test for such
and the MADA’s requirements enhance competition overall. The same conclusion
holds with even greater certainty under the rule-of-reason analysis for software 
integration that the D.C. Circuit adopted in its historic Microsoft decision.
devices.  As a matter of antitrust law, Google’s distribution of apps as part of a 
arrangements.  Google does not force consumers to pay for apps they do not want, 
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Although European competition law differs in some respects from American
antitrust law, the pertinent economic analysis does not vary by jurisdiction. 
Google’s licensing practice has invigorated competition among mobile platforms 
and mobile devices.  Google’s distribution of free mobile apps in GMS has produced 
a market success, not a market failure, and should not be considered anticompetitive. 
JEL: D4; D42; K21; L11; L12; L41; L86; O34 
II. INTRODUCTION 
Google, famous for its popular search engine, entered the mobile device 
business with its launch of the first Android-operated mobile device in
2008.1  Android, an operating system (OS) for mobile devices, is an open-
source platform available under the Apache open-source license free of
charge to any end user, manufacturer of mobile devices, or developer of 
applications (apps).2  Google also develops mobile apps that enable users
to manage various functions on their mobile devices, such as checking 
email, watching videos, browsing the Internet, and accessing instant chat 
services.3  End users can download the vast majority of Google apps on 
their mobile devices free of charge.  Google also permits manufacturers 
to preload a set of Google apps—called Google Mobile Services (GMS)— 
on their mobile devices if they so choose.  Google thereby makes its apps 
available to the end user “out of the box.” Google offers GMS to 
manufacturers free of charge, provided that the manufacturer accepts the 
conditions specified in its Mobile Application Distribution Agreement
(MADA).4 
In April 2015, the European Commission formally opened an investigation
into Google’s licensing practices with respect to the Android mobile 
operating system, mobile apps, and mobile services.5  The Commission 
1. Erick Tseng, The First Android-Powered Phone, GOOGLE OFFICIAL BLOG (Sept. 
23, 2008), http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2008/09/first-android-powered-phone.html [http:// 
perma.cc/7LAM-E9LZ]. 
2. See The Android Source Code, ANDROID, http://source.android.com/source/
index.html [http://perma.cc/K6PH-G3D5] (last visited Aug. 11, 2015); Licenses, ANDROID, 
http://source.android.com/source/licenses.html [http://perma.cc/ED82-LPL9] (last visited 
Aug. 11, 2015). 
3. See, e.g., Google Mobile, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/mobile/ [http://perma. 
cc/Y5WM-4FWF] (last visited July 15, 2015); Google Apps for Work, GOOGLE, http://www.
google.com/work/apps/business/ [http://perma.cc/S9C4-57BB] (last visited Aug. 11, 2015).
 4. See infra Part VI.C.
5. European Commission Press Release IP/15/4780, Antitrust: Commission Sends 
Statement of Objections to Google on Comparison Shopping Service; Opens Separate 
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said that “Android has become the leading operating system for smart 
mobile devices in the [European Economic Area], to the extent that today,
the majority of smartphones in Europe are based on Android.”6  The  
Commission added that, although Android is an open-source operating 
system, “[t]he majority of smartphone and tablet manufacturers . . . use 
the Android operating system in combination with a range of Google’s 
proprietary applications and services.”7  The Commission further observed 
that “to obtain the right to install these applications and services on their
Android devices, manufacturers [of mobile devices] need to enter into
certain agreements with Google.”8  The antitrust investigation will evaluate
whether “certain conditions in Google’s agreements associated with the 
use of Android and Google’s proprietary applications and services breach
EU antitrust rules.”9  In particular, the Commission will analyze 
1.	 whether Google has illegally hindered the development and 
market access of rival mobile applications or services by
requiring or incentivizing smartphone and tablet manufacturers 
to exclusively pre-install Google’s own applications or
services;
2.	 whether Google has prevented smartphone and tablet 
manufacturers who wish to install Google’s applications 
and services . . . from developing and marketing modified 
and potentially competing versions of Android . . . on other
devices, thereby illegally hindering the development and 
market access of rival mobile operating systems and mobile 
applications or services;
3.	 whether Google has illegally hindered the development and 
market access of rival applications and services by tying or
bundling certain Google applications and services distributed
on Android devices with other Google applications, services 
and/or application programming interfaces of Google.10 
Formal Investigation on Android (Apr. 15, 2015), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP­
15-4780_en.htm [http://perma.cc/4H54-D8RV] [hereinafter Press Release, Commission
Sends Statement of Objections to Google]. 
6. European Commission Press Release MEMO/15/4782, Antitrust: Commission
Opens Formal Investigation Against Google in Relation to Android Mobile Operating 





 10. Id. 
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Margrethe Vestager, the EU Commissioner for Competition, emphasized 
that the investigation will ensure that “the markets in this area can flourish
without anticompetitive constraints imposed by any company.”11 
The Commission’s formal investigation against Google comes after
private litigation in the United States raised similar theories.  In April 
2013, FairSearch—an association founded by Microsoft, Nokia, and 
several other software and Internet companies—filed a complaint with the
European Commission alleging that the MADA’s terms are anticompetitive.12 
In April 2014, an antitrust class action complaint filed against Google by 
individual mobile device owners in the U.S. District Court for the Northern 
District of California presented similar allegations.13  The class action 
plaintiff filed an amended complaint on August 1, 2014.14  The amended 
class action complaint alleged that the MADA’s requirements enable 
Google to “maintain and extend” its alleged monopoly in the “general 
search” and “handheld general search” markets.15  Judge Beth Freeman of
the Northern District of California, however, dismissed the amended
complaint on February 20, 2015, finding that “the allegation of antitrust 
injury [fell] short of the plausibility standard.”16  She also found that the 
plaintiffs’ claims “fail[ed] to explain how the logical leap from that
allegation to substantial market foreclosure in the market for general
handheld search . . . [was] reasonably based upon the existence of MADAs.”17 
Though Judge Freeman left the plaintiffs the option to amend the claims 
11. Press Release, Commission Sends Statement of Objections to Google, supra 
note 5.
 12. FairSearch Announces Complaint in EU on Google’s Anti-Competitive Mobile 
Strategy, FAIRSEARCH (Apr. 9, 2013), http://www.fairsearch.org/mobile/fairsearch-announces­
complaint-in-eu-on-googles-anti-competitive-mobile-strategy/ [http://perma.cc/HTH7­
A9ZM]; see also Foo Yun Chee & Alexi Oreskovic, European Regulators Training Sights 
on Google’s Mobile Software, REUTERS (July 30, 2014, 5:15 PM), http://www.reuters. 
com/article/2014/07/30/us-google-europe-android-insight-idUSKBN0FZ2B220140730 
[http://perma.cc/ES3Y-UN6B] (“European regulators are laying the groundwork for a case 
centered on whether Google abuses the 80 percent market share of its Android mobile
operating system to promote services from maps to search.”). 
13. Class Action Complaint, Feitelson v. Google Inc., No. 5:14-cv-02007-HRL 
(N.D. Cal. May 1, 2014), 2014 WL 1715185 [hereinafter Class Action Complaint]. 
14. First Amended Class Action Complaint, Feitelson v. Google Inc., No. 5:14-cv­
02007-BLF (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2014), 2014 WL 3971376 [hereinafter First Amended Class 
Action Complaint]. 
15. Id. at 4. 
16. Order Granting Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint With Leave to 
Amend at 12, Feitelson v. Google Inc., No. 5:14-cv-02007-BLF (N.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2015). 
17. Id. at 15. 
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and present more plausible allegations about the anticompetitive effects 
of Google’s licensing practice to the court,18 the plaintiffs voluntarily 
dismissed the case on April 3, 2015.19 
In this Article, I examine the economic implications that the MADA 
has on the concerned markets and ultimately on consumers.  I show that 
Google’s licensing practices increase consumer welfare and therefore 
should not raise anticompetitive concerns. 
In Part III of this Article, I review the economic literature on potential tying 
arrangements.  Most economists recognize that tying usually increases 
competition and benefits consumers by reducing costs or improving 
quality control.20  Although some theorists describe models in which tying 
might have harmful effects, economists generally caution, first, that courts 
will find these models to have little practical value in antitrust inquiries 
and, second, that the effects of alleged tying be assessed factually on a 
case-by-case basis.21  Put differently, tying practices rarely have 
anticompetitive effects. In Part IV, I analyze the development of the U.S.
Supreme Court’s evolving antitrust jurisprudence on tying arrangements. 
Although the Court continues to label some tying arrangements as per se 
illegal, in fact the Court applies a rule of reason analysis that requires an
analysis of foreclosure effects and includes an affirmative defense of 
efficiency justifications.  In Part V, I examine the explicit rule of reason
standard for software integration used by the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the D.C. Circuit. I identify the elements that one needs to prove to show 
that a tying practice constitutes anticompetitive behavior. 
In Part VI, I explain the relevance of the MADA’s requirements to
Google’s business model.  I first analyze the relationship between the 
Android OS, Google apps, and GMS.  Although the use of these products 
is interrelated, Google does not precondition the use of one product on the 
use of another.  In particular, a manufacturer using the Android OS on its
devices is not forced to preload GMS.  The manufacturer may offer its 
devices without any Google apps.22  In fact, Amazon has decided to offer 
a set of smartphones and tablets that operate on Android but do not have 
GMS preloaded.23  In addition, manufacturers that preload GMS are free
 18. Id. at 19. 
19. Plaintiffs’ Notice of Voluntary Dismissal, Feitelson v. Google Inc., No. 5:14­
cv-02007-BLF (N.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2015) [hereinafter Plaintiffs’ Notice of Voluntary
Dismissal]. 
20. See infra Part III. 
21. See infra Part III. 
22. See infra Part VI. 
23. See Peter Burrows, Amazon Fire Takes Android, Leaves Google Apps Behind 
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 24, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-24/amazon-fire­
takes-android-while-leaving-google-apps-behind-tech.html [http://perma.cc/S7HT-T8DK].
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to—and in fact often do—preload on their mobile devices non-Google
apps as well. I next show how the MADA’s features serve Google’s 
business model.  By providing an open mobile platform, Android facilitates 
Google’s participation in the mobile device business.  Android and GMS
are free, which increases Google’s audience of end users.  Google’s role 
in developing Android as a trusted open platform was important to 
Google’s successful entry into mobile markets.  The MADA addresses the 
risk that Android will fragment into incompatible versions—a particularly 
severe risk for open operating systems, such as Android.24  The MADA’s
requirements enable Android-operated devices that include GMS to meet
consumer expectations, by offering an out of the box experience comparable
to that offered by mobile devices that rely on closed or propriety operating 
systems.  The MADA’s requirements also enable Google to avoid free 
riding and cherry-picking by its competitors, which would harm Google’s 
ability to fund continued investments in innovation for mobile devices and
applications. Therefore, Google has compelling business justifications for
the MADA’s licensing requirements.
In Part VII, I examine the antitrust allegations that the MADA’s 
requirements enable Google to restrict competition from other developers’
apps, restrict manufacturers’ choice of apps, and protect Google’s alleged 
monopoly over general search.  Those allegations are unpersuasive as a 
factual matter, as an economic matter, and ultimately as a legal matter. 
Under U.S. antitrust law, the allegations presented against Google cannot
support the prima facie case for unlawful tying under the Supreme Court’s
current jurisprudence. A court should well consider the apps distributed 
as a suite in GMS to be a single product, not two (or more) distinct 
products.  There is no evidence that Google has market power over any
service in the app suite. Hence, Google cannot meaningfully force any
consumers to pay for a product that they do not want.  In short, the MADA 
requirements harm neither consumers nor competition. 
One reaches the same conclusion when analyzing the economic impact 
of the MADA’s requirements under the D.C. Circuit’s rule of reason
approach to software integration.  Google’s strategy of distributing free 
apps for Android is lawful and benefits consumers.  By making GMS 
24. See, e.g., Neil McAllister, Google to Devs: Fragmenting Android Is Against the 
Rules, REGISTER (Nov. 15, 2012, 9:08 PM), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2012/11/15/ 
android_sdk_fragmentation_license_change/ [http://perma.cc/6NZV-6KKT] (emphasizing 
Android’s vulnerability to fragmentation). 
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available out of the box and free of charge, the MADA directly benefits 
consumers. The MADA’s requirements also benefit manufacturers of 
mobile devices.  The ability to obtain both the OS and GMS free of charge 
enables a manufacturer to compete effectively with vertically integrated
mobile device manufacturers without developing its own OS, mobile 
suite, or both. Furthermore, by sustaining Android’s appeal, the MADA’s 
requirements enable Google to compete with other OS providers in attracting 
app developers. Therefore, the MADA not only benefits consumers, but 
also creates significant positive externalities that benefit other stakeholders in
the mobile industry.
Although EU competition rules on tying practices may differ from U.S. 
antitrust rules, the conclusions drawn from proper economic analysis do 
not. Economic analysis of Google’s licensing practice shows that the 
MADA’s requirements promote Android’s competitiveness in the market
for mobile platforms.25  Android’s competitiveness benefits not only Google
and its consumers, but also other stakeholders in the mobile-device 
industry, such as manufactures of mobile devices and app developers.  By 
keeping the market for mobile operating systems competitive, the MADA’s
requirements thus benefit consumers both directly and indirectly.
III. THE ECONOMICS OF TYING ARRANGEMENTS 
A “tie-in” or “tying” refers to a seller’s offer to sell one product (the 
tying product) only if the buyer will purchase from that seller another 
product (the tied product).26  A tying arrangement can be a bundled tie (for
example, the sale of a pair of shoelaces), a contractual tie (for example, 
contractually mandating the purchase of insurance from a particular company
with a car rental), or a technological tie (for example, the functional 
integration of a music app with a computer’s OS).27  Although some
economists have theorized that tying or bundling might be anticompetitive, 
the dominant view within economic theory is that tying usually is 
procompetitive and enhances consumer welfare.
 25. See infra Part VII.C. 
26. See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1958). 
27. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: SINGLE-FIRM
CONDUCT UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT 78 (2008), http://www.justice. 
gov/atr/public/reports/236681.pdf [http://perma.cc/SXE9-Z3HQ] (defining different types 
of tying arrangements); see also J. Gregory Sidak, Debunking Predatory Innovation, 
83 COLUM. L. REV. 1121 (1983) (providing an early analysis of technological tie-ins). 
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A. Tying Usually Enhances Competition 
Economists have described numerous examples when a tying practice 
serves a procompetitive purpose.28  Tying can enable economies of joint 
sales, and thereby reduce costs and lower prices to consumers.  When the 
cost of offering a choice is high (for example, as with the labor and 
distribution costs of configuring an entirely different array of options for 
each buyer of a new car), a producer may bundle product features to
reduce costs by offering options only in a limited range of bundles.  Bundling 
in such cases can improve welfare.29 
When buyers have diverse preferences, tying multiple goods in one 
package increases overall output and social welfare.30  Suppose buyer A 
values product X at $50 and product Y at $20, and buyer B values product 
X at $20 and product Y at $50. If the seller does not bundle the products, 
he will sell both products at $50 each.  The seller will receive $100, and 
both buyers will obtain only one product each.  To sell both products to 
both of the buyers, the seller would need to set the price at $20, which
would yield revenue of only $80.  On the other hand, the seller can sell a 
bundle containing both goods at $70.  In that case, the seller will receive 
$140, and both buyers will obtain two products.  This example does not 
depend on the seller having market power over either product X or product
Y. Bundling of software features is common in competitive markets.  For 
example, office suites—like Microsoft Office—typically bundle the 
spreadsheet with the text editor to enable the user to create both graphs 
and text documents. Software makers have a strong incentive to bundle 
complementary software products to increase demand.31 
Bundling products may also decrease the cost of manufacturing products 
for a wider range of consumers.32  Consider the myriad sections contained 
28. See Alden F. Abbott & Joshua D. Wright, Antitrust Analysis of Tying
Arrangements and Exclusive Dealing, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS: 
ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS 183, 189–90 (Keith N. Hylton ed., 2d ed. 2010). 
29. See David S. Evans & Michael Salinger, Why Do Firms Bundle and Tie?
Evidence from Competitive Markets and Implications for Tying Law, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 
37, 70–71 (2005). 
30. See J. Gregory Sidak, An Antitrust Rule for Software Integration, 18 YALE J. ON 
REG. 1, 15–17 (2001); see also Direct Testimony of Professor Richard L. Schmalensee on
behalf of Microsoft Corp. para. 241, United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232 
(D.D.C. 1999) (applying this rationale to bundling of web browsers and operating systems).
 31. Sidak, supra note 30, at 17. 
32. See Evans & Salinger, supra note 29, at 52–53. 
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in the Sunday New York Times. The marginal cost to the newspaper of 
providing the book review section to someone interested only in the sports 
section is zero.  That condition holds regardless of the fact that the New
York Review of Books can exist as a freestanding (unbundled) substitute 
for the New York Times Book Review. Indeed, the marginal cost to the 
New York Times of stripping the New York Times Book Review from the 
newspaper going to subscribers who read only the sports section would be 
astronomical.  If priced on an avoided-cost basis, the stripped-down 
Sunday New York Times would cost more than the fully integrated 
33newspaper.
Bundling often increases demand for the bundled products.34  Increased 
demand results from product integration if there is superadditivity of 
demand across two outputs, A and B, when they are produced as an
integrated product. The increased demand may result because the product 
definition has changed as a result of the integration in a manner that 
produces more satisfaction (utility) for consumers.  Otherwise, bundling 
may result because the integration of A and B reduces the cost to the 
consumer of engaging in product assembly or integration on her own.  Or,
the increased demand may result from some factor that is impossible to 
predict a priori, but is reflected, ultimately and objectively, in consumers’
higher willingness to pay.
Lower costs result from product integration if there is subadditivity of
costs across two outputs, A and B. This efficiency will unambiguously 
benefit consumers, because even a monopolist’s profit-maximizing price 
will fall in the face of declining costs.35 Subadditivity of costs is present if 
a firm with a given cost function “has lower costs than would an allocation
of output among two or more firms using the same cost function.”36  In other
words, it is more efficient for the single firm to produce A and B as an 
integrated product than it is for the firm (or multiple firms) to produce A 
separately from B.37  Such efficiencies are also known as economies of 
scope.38 “The firm’s technology is said to exhibit economies of scope when
it is less costly for one firm to produce a set of goods jointly than for distinct 
firms to produce individual goods or subsets of goods separately.”39
 33. See MASSIMO MOTTA, COMPETITION POLICY: THEORY AND PRACTICE 460 (2004). 
34. See Evans & Salinger, supra note 29, at 63. 
35. J. GREGORY SIDAK & DANIEL F. SPULBER, DEREGULATORY TAKINGS AND THE
REGULATORY CONTRACT: THE COMPETITIVE TRANSFORMATION OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES
IN THE UNITED STATES 20 (1997).
 36. Id.
 37. Id.
 38. Id. at 22. 
39. Id. “[A]lthough natural monopoly implies economies of scope, the converse is
not the case.  Most multiproduct firms derive economies of scope from joint production;
628 
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The analysis of cost subadditivity also implicitly answers the question 
of who—the producer or the consumer—is the more efficient integrator
of individual functionalities.  Although it may be feasible for the 
consumer to integrate separate functionalities, the consumer may not be 
the lowest-cost integrator.  The superior efficiency of the producer is a 
factual question whose answer depends on economies of scale and scope 
as well as learning-by-doing effects that allow the producer’s unit cost of 
product integration to fall over time, with its level of cumulative output. 
In the case of a mobile device, the producer in this sense collectively 
consists of the provider of the mobile OS and apps, the manufacturer, and 
the mobile network operator. 
Further, tying products also often improves the user experience.40  Tying 
can enable a firm “to ensure proper performance of a product system.”41 
Quality control is especially important for complex goods like software. 
Consumers might have a limited understanding of how such complex
systems work and might use inferior or incompatible components.42 
Consumers might consequently blame one firm for a failure caused by
the deficiencies of another firm’s product.43  When tying performs a quality
control function, it clearly enhances consumer welfare.44 
B. 	Are Theoretical Models of Anticompetitive Tying Robust Enough to 
Justify Antitrust Intervention? 
Economists and legal scholars associated with the Chicago School of
antitrust analysis disputed the early view that a monopolist could use tying 
and bundling to leverage its market power in one market into a second
market and charge supracompetitive prices in the second market.45 
it is a primary motivation for companies to diversify their product offerings.  That 
achievement of economies of scope does not imply that those companies could serve their 
entire markets at lower cost than two or more firms.”  Id.
 40. See ROBERT O’DONOGHUE & A. JORGE PADILLA, THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF 
ARTICLE 82 EC, at 482 (2006). 
41. See Sidak, supra note 27, at 1136. 
42. See Sidak, supra note 30, at 9.
 43. Id.
 44. See MOTTA, supra note 33, at 461 (explaining that tying different components 
together might be “an efficient response to asymmetric information” and can enable the 
seller to ensure that “consumers enjoy the highest possible quality of the products they
buy”).
 45. See 3A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN 
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 758b (2d ed. 2002); 
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Herbert Hovenkamp—not considered a Chicago School antitrust scholar 
—has succinctly summarized this key insight: “[I]n any multi-stage 
distribution chain there is but a single monopoly profit to be earned.”46 
This “single monopoly profit theorem” demonstrates that a monopolist 
selling two complementary goods can earn a monopoly profit only in the 
market for one of those goods—either that of the tying product or the tied
product.47  Therefore, the monopolist cannot increase its total profit by 
monopolizing a market for a complementary product if that market is 
competitive.  Nobel laureate George Stigler presented a simple example:
if product A is worth $100 to a consumer and product B is worth nothing, 
by tying B to A, the manufacturer will not be able to charge the consumer 
more than $100.48  Chicago School economists and legal scholars thus
argued that anticompetitive purposes rarely motivate tying agreements.
To the contrary, tying agreements typically exist to reduce costs or
implement price discrimination.49 
Despite recognizing the typically procompetitive effects of tying, some 
economists and legal scholars—often identified with the “Post-Chicago
School” of antitrust economics—argued that the Chicago School overstated 
the case that tying is not anticompetitive.  For example, Einer Elhauge 
asserts that the single monopoly profit theorem holds only when the 
following conditions are met: (1) the tying product and the tied product
are consumed in fixed proportion, (2) the demand for the two products are 
highly correlated, (3) the tying product is consumed at fixed levels, (4) the 
competitiveness of the market for the tying product is fixed, and (5) the 
competitiveness of the market for the tied product is fixed.50  Elhauge
argues that, when those conditions are relaxed, the single monopoly profit 
theorem is wrong—that is, that tying can have anticompetitive effects.51 
He maintains that tying can enable the monopolist to price-discriminate 
ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 372–75 
(1993); Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE
L.J. 19 (1957); Aaron Director & Edward H. Levi, Law and the Future: Trade Regulation, 
51 NW. U. L. REV. 281, 290 (1956); Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust 
Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925, 927–28 (1979). 
46. Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Sale Restraints and Competitive Harm: The First 
Sale Doctrine in Perspective, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 487, 515 (2011). 
47. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 372–75 (1993). 
48. George J. Stigler, United States v. Loew’s Inc.: A Note on Block-Booking, 1963 
SUP. CT. REV. 152, 152–53.  The late Judge Bork and I discussed the implications of the 
single-monopoly-profit theorem for antitrust analysis of Google’s business in Robert H.
Bork & J. Gregory Sidak, What Does the Chicago School Teach About Internet Search
and the Antitrust Treatment of Google?, 8 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 663, 674–77 (2012). 
49. See BORK, supra note 47, at 375–81. 
 50. Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single Monopoly
Profit Theory, 123 HARV. L. REV. 397, 400 (2009). 
51. Id. at 404. 
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among buyers of the tying product if buyers consume the tied product in 
varying amounts.52  Further, Elhauge maintains that tying can allow the 
monopolist to price discriminate among buyers of both the tying and the 
tied products if the demand for the tying product and that for the tied 
product are not highly correlated.53  According to Elhauge, tying may thus 
allow the monopolist to extract the consumer surplus of each individual 
buyer.54  Finally, Elhauge suggests that tying can increase market power 
in the tied product or in the tying product markets.  For example, he 
suggests that by foreclosing the tied market and thereby hindering entry
into the tying market by firms in the tied market, a firm can preserve its 
market power in the tying market.55 
Antitrust scholars have exposed several flaws in Elhauge’s criticism of 
the single-monopoly-profit theorem.56  First, they observe that Elhauge’s
criticism contradicts the available empirical evidence.57  Several empirical 
studies have shown that tying arrangements more often increase consumer
welfare than harm consumers.58  Hence, Elhauge’s statement that tying 
will generally serve an anticompetitive purpose finds no empirical
support. Second, Elhauge’s analysis is artificially narrow, as he disputes 
only the horizontal application of the single monopoly profit theorem and
ignores its vertical application.59  Finally, Elhauge’s conclusion that tying 
is generally anticompetitive rests on a restrictive array of factual scenarios 
regarding metering ties, bundling, or imperfect price discrimination.60  For
example, Elhauge assumes that: (1) demand for the monopoly good and 
52. Id.
 53. Id. at 405.  “Without strong positive demand correlation, tying can profitably
permit price discrimination across buyers of both products.”  Id. at 400. 
54. Id. at 400 (“If buyers purchase varying amounts of the tying product, tying can 
profitably extract consumer surplus from individual buyers.”). 
55. Id. at 413.  “Without fixed tying market competitiveness, tying can increase the 
degree of tying market power.”  Id. at 400. 
56. See Paul Seabright, Group Commentary on Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the 
Death of the Single Monopoly Profit Theory by Einer Elhauge: The Undead? A Comment 
on Professor Elhauge’s Paper, 5 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 243 (2009); see also Daniel 
A. Crane & Joshua D. Wright, Commentary, Can Bundled Discounting Increase Consumer
Prices Without Excluding Rivals?, 5 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 209 (2009). 
57. Seabright, supra note 56, at 243–44, 246–47. 
58. See id. at 244; Crane & Wright, supra note 56, at 210 (citing Bruce H. 
Kobayashi, Does Economics Provide a Reliable Guide to Regulating Commodity Bundling 
By Firms? A Survey of the Economic Literature, 1 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 707 
(2005)); Evans & Salinger, supra note 29. 
59. See, e.g., Bork & Sidak, supra note 48, at 675–77, 676 n.44. 
60. Id. at 676 n.44. 
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the competitive good are independent, and (2) the tying must coerce the 
buyer of the monopoly good to purchase all future quantities of the 
competitive good at monopoly prices.  However, as Paul Seabright observes, 
except “in wildly implausible circumstances,” these two conditions are 
extremely unlikely ever to be met simultaneously.61 
Similarly, Michael Whinston theorized that the Chicago School critique 
of leveraging applies only when the tied market is perfectly competitive.62 
In his model, tying commits the monopolist to being more aggressive than 
the entrant, and that commitment discourages entry. Whinston shows that
tying could be used to deter entry into, and thereby to monopolize, the tied 
product market if (1) the selling firm is a monopolist in the tying product 
market, (2) the tied-product market has decreasing average costs over the 
relevant range of output, and (3) the tied and tying products are used in 
variable proportions.63  Whinston finds, however, that the predicted welfare
effects of even that specialized case of tying are ambiguous.64 
In sum, theories of the anticompetitive effects of tying rest on numerous 
assumptions that are either unrealistic or impossible to prove as a factual
matter in litigation.  As Judge Frank Easterbrook has said, “The development 
of complex models is one thing, proof of their utility is another.”65  Even
the authors of theoretical models of anticompetitive tying concede that
their analysis does not “justify intervention on antitrust grounds.”66  To 
the contrary, they emphasize that attempting to eliminate inefficiency by
means of antitrust intervention is “fraught with the usual difficulties of 
figuring out when to intervene and interfering with the functioning of 
markets.”67 Application of tying theories that rest on complex assumptions
would lead to an increased error rate in the courts.  These errors would 
deter efficient behavior and distort dynamic competition.68 
As a result, economists generally advocate a cautious approach to 
scrutinizing tying agreements under antitrust law.  They emphasize that a 
rule of per se illegality is not justified and that tying agreements should be 
61. Seabright, supra note 56, at 248. 
62. Michael D. Whinston, Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 
837, 838–39 (1990). 
63. See id. at 846, 850, 854. 
64. Id. at 855–56. 
65. Frank H. Easterbrook, Correspondence, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 MICH. L.  
REV. 1696, 1709 (1986). 
66. Dennis W. Carlton, Joshua S. Gans & Michael Waldman, Why Tie a Product 
Consumers Do Not Use?, AM. ECON. J.:  MICROECONOMICS, Aug. 2010, at 85, 102. 
67. Id.
 68. See Robert H. Bork & J. Gregory Sidak, The Misuse of Profit Margins To Infer 
Market Power, 9 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 511, 524–26 (2013) (quoting Frank H. 
Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2 (1984)). 
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evaluated on a case-by-case basis.69 Massimo Motta, the current chief 
economist of the Directorate General for Competition of the European
Commission, explains that, “[i]n most cases, tying will have efficiency 
effects that will benefit consumers . . . . [However,] in a few (probably
rare) cases, it might have harmful exclusionary effects that should be
balanced with any possible efficiency effects.”70  As a result, in Motta’s
view, a full investigation is necessary to weigh the potential negative 
effects with the efficiency justifications behind the tying practice.71  In  
particular, scholars emphasize that a theoretical demonstration of harm
does not suffice to establish that the scrutinized practice actually harms 
consumers.72  It is necessary to evaluate whether such harm has arisen in 
practice.




In 2006, the Supreme Court in Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent 
Ink, Inc.73 abandoned the presumption, announced in 1949 in Standard
Oil of California v. United States, that tying agreements “serve hardly any 
other purpose beyond the suppression of competition.”74  Even before 
2006, the Court had indicated its declining support for the older proposition
that tying should be per se illegal by ruling that a tying arrangement is
unlawful only if four elements are met: (1) there are two separate products 
or services, (2) the sale of one product or service (the tying product) is 
conditioned upon the purchase of another product (the tied product), (3)
the seller possesses market power in the tying product market, and (4) the 
tie-in forecloses a substantial amount of the commerce in the tied product
 69. See, e.g., Jean Tirole, The Analysis of Tying Cases: A Primer, 1 COMPETITION
POL’Y INT’L 1, 25 (2005); MOTTA, supra note 33, at 463; Evans & Salinger, supra note
29, at 42. 
70. MOTTA, supra note 33, at 467. 
71. Id. 
72. Dennis W. Carlton & Michael Waldman, The Strategic Use of Tying To 
Preserve and Create Market Power in Evolving Industries, 33 RAND J. ECON. 194, 215
(2002) (“[T]rying to turn the theoretical possibility for harm shown here into a prescriptive
theory of antitrust enforcement is a difficult task.”). 
73. Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 35, 36 (2006) (quoting
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305–06 (1949)). 
74. Standard Oil Co., 337 U.S. at 305–06. 
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market.75  Various lower courts76 have interpreted this fourth element to
require proof of an anticompetitive effect in the tied market comparable 
to the “dangerous probability of achieving monopoly power” that the 
Court requires for the prima facie case for attempted monopolization
under section 2 of the Sherman Act.77 Only when all four elements are 
met will the Court consider a tying practice anticompetitive.  Even if those 
four conditions are present, fact-based evidence of economic efficiencies 
can overcome a finding of per se illegality.78  In particular, the evaluation 
of market power depends not on evidentiary presumptions, but on 
economic evidence.79  Accordingly, the Court’s antitrust scrutiny of tying 
arrangements has evolved from a per se analysis to what is instead a de
facto rule of reason analysis. 
A. Jefferson Parish 
In Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, the Court in 1984 
examined an agreement by which a hospital required its patients to 
procure anesthesiology services from only one firm of anesthesiologists.80 
In an opinion by Justice Stevens, the Court said that, although it was “far 
too late in the history of our antitrust jurisprudence to question the 
proposition that certain tying arrangements pose an unacceptable risk of 
75. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 462 (1992). 
76. See, e.g., Technical Res. Servs., Inc. v. Dornier Med. Sys., Inc., 134 F.3d 1458, 
1466, 1468 (11th Cir. 1998); Carl Sandburg Vill. Condo. Ass’n No. 1 v. First Condo. Dev. 
Co., 758 F.2d 203, 210–11 (7th Cir. 1985); Will v. Comprehensive Accounting Corp., 776
F.2d 665, 671 (7th Cir. 1985). 
77. See, e.g., Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 455–56 (1993). 
78. See Eastman Kodak Co., 504 U.S. at 486; see also Mozart Co. v. Mercedes-
Benz of N. Am., Inc., 833 F.2d 1342, 1351 (9th Cir. 1987) (permitting a business 
justification defense of quality assurance and goodwill for a tied-in product); Johnson v. 
Nationwide Indus., Inc., 715 F.2d 1233, 1237 (7th Cir. 1983) (permitting the tying of a 
management contract to the sales of condominiums); Dehydrating Process Co. v. A. O.
Smith Corp., 292 F.2d 653, 655–56 (1st Cir. 1961) (permitting the seller of silos to tie silo
unloaders where many silo customers using unloaders of other manufacturers complained
of problems). 
79. Extending this reasoning, the analysis of market power should not focus simply
on the defendant firm’s market share.  Rather, the analysis of market power must consider 
the firm’s market share together with other relevant factors—including the price elasticities of
demand and of supply—while discounting ambiguous evidence such as profit margins. 
See Bork & Sidak, supra note 68, at 530 (explaining why courts should be skeptical of 
using profit margins to infer market power); Franklin M. Fisher & John J. McGowan, On 
the Misuse of Accounting Rates of Return to Infer Monopoly Profits, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 
82 (1983); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94
HARV. L. REV. 937, 983 (1981) (describing method to estimate the price elasticity of
demand (for the market and for the defendant firm) and the price elasticity of supply to
assess market power rigorously).
80. Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 6 (1984). 
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stifling competition and therefore are unreasonable ‘per se,’” it was 
nonetheless the case that “not every refusal to sell two products separately
can be said to restrain competition.”81  Illegal tying arrangements were 
distinguished by “the essential characteristic of . . . forc[ing] the buyer 
into the purchase of a tied product that the buyer either did not want at all,
or might have preferred to purchase elsewhere on different terms.”82  In
contrast, tying arrangements used to maximize a seller’s return on the 
tying product were not subject to per se condemnation, for they were not 
necessarily coercive or anticompetitive.83 
No Justice dissented. In that sense, Jefferson Parish might seem a 
simple case. However, the concurring opinions reveal that the real debate 
between the Justices concerned the continued wisdom of a per se rule.84 
In her concurring opinion, Justice O’Connor (joined by Chief Justice 
Burger and Justices Rehnquist and Powell) criticized the per se rule for 
requiring a court to conduct a fact-intensive inquiry into the real-world 
economic effects of a tie-in while denying the court the ability to permit 
the tie-in if the evidence showed it to be beneficial.85  Justice O’Connor’s
approach would evaluate tying arrangements according to the rule of 
reason, which would invalidate such arrangements only in the “rare cases 
where power in the market for the tying product is used to create 
additional market power in the market for the tied product.”86  A plaintiff
would need to meet a higher evidentiary threshold for a court to invalidate 
a tie-in per se—proving that the seller had market power in the tying-
product market,87 that there existed a “substantial threat that the tying 
seller will acquire market power in the tied-product market,”88 and that 
there existed a “coherent economic basis for treating the tying and tied 
products as distinct.”89  Finally, even if the plaintiff made such a showing, 
a tie-in still would be permitted if its economic benefits exceeded its 
81. Id. at 9, 11.
 82. Id. at 12. 
83. Id. at 14. 
84. Compare id. at 32 (Brennan, J., concurring) (endorsing the per se rule), with id. 
at 32–47 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (opposing the per se rule in favor of an analysis of 
tie-ins under the rule of reason). 
85. Id. at 34 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
86. Id. at 36. 
87. Id. at 37. 
88. Id. at 38. 
89. Id. at 39. 
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harms.90  As mentioned above, various lower courts have in fact followed 
Justice O’Connor’s approach by interpreting the fourth element for 
unlawful tying to require proof of an anticompetitive effect in the tied
market that resembles the proof of a “dangerous probability of achieving 
monopoly power” that the Court considers under section 2 of the Sherman
Act,91 and by accepting fact-based evidence of economic efficiencies to 
preclude a finding of per se illegality.92 
One important point of disagreement between the majority opinion and 
the concurring opinions in Jefferson Parish was the question of how to 
determine whether the tying arrangement involved two products or only
one.  According to the majority, “the answer to the question whether one 
or two products are involved turns not on the functional relation between
them, but rather on the character of the demand for the two items.”93 
Under the majority’s approach, two products are deemed to exist if 
sufficient demand exists to create distinct and separate markets for both 
the tying and the tied products.94  Justice O’Connor rejected this reasoning. 
She (and the three other concurring Justices) thought it was absurd to 
apply the majority’s analysis to integrated products: 
All but the simplest products can be broken down into two or more components
that are “tied together” in the final sale.  Unless it is to be illegal to sell cars with 
engines or cameras with lenses, this analysis must be guided by some limiting 
principle . . . . Even when the tied product does have a use separate from the 
tying product, it makes little sense to label a package as two products without also
considering the economic justifications for the sale of the package as a unit. 
When the economic advantages of joint packaging are substantial the package is
not appropriately viewed as two products, and that should be the end of the tying
inquiry.95 
Eight years later, in 1992, the Court would revisit this issue of how to
determine whether an alleged tie-in involves two products or one.
B. Kodak 
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc. concerned Kodak’s 
practice of tying replacement parts to the purchase of repair services for
 90. Id. at 41. 
91. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
92. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 486 (1992); 
see also Dehydrating Process Co. v. A. O. Smith Corp., 292 F.2d 653, 655–56 (1st Cir. 
1961); Johnson v. Nationwide Indus., Inc., 715 F.2d 1233, 1237 (7th Cir. 1983); Mozart 
Co. v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 833 F.2d 1342, 1351 (9th Cir. 1987). 
93. Jefferson Par., 466 U.S. at 19. 
94. Id. at 21–22. 
95. Id. at 39–40 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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Kodak photocopiers.96  The Court considered whether, for purposes of 
tying law, replacement parts and repair service for Kodak photocopiers 
were separate products.97  Justice Blackmun’s opinion for the Court found 
that parts and service were distinct markets and rejected Kodak’s claim 
that, even if the company held a monopoly over replacement parts for 
Kodak photocopiers, interbrand competition among photocopier manufacturers 
prevented Kodak from exploiting that market power.98 
Notwithstanding the reasoning of Justice O’Connor’s concurrence on 
behalf of four Justices in Jefferson Parish, the Court in Kodak first found 
that parts and service could plausibly be considered separate products 
because there was “sufficient consumer demand so that it [would be] efficient 
for a firm to provide service separately from parts.”99  The Court dismissed 
the argument that parts and service could not constitute distinct markets 
because no demand existed for parts separately from service: “By that 
logic, we would be forced to conclude that there can never be separate 
markets, for example, for cameras and film, computers and software, or
automobiles and tires.”100 Kodak, the Court observed, sold service with 
parts to some, service without parts to others, and parts without service to
yet other consumers.101 
In a dissent joined by Justices O’Connor and Thomas, Justice Scalia— 
who, like Justice Thomas, had joined the Court since it had decided Jefferson 
Parish—criticized the majority’s reliance on “sufficient consumer demand” 
to find that replacement parts and repair service constituted distinct markets.102 
He found that not only was the repair service that Kodak provided “inherently
associated with the parts,” but that customers tended to demand the two
items in fixed proportions, buying “one part with one unit of service 
necessary to install the part.”103  Quoting the antitrust casebook by Phillip 
Areeda and Louis Kaplow, which in turn quoted Ward Bowman’s influential
1957 article on the economics of tie-ins, Justice Scalia observed: “When
that situation obtains, ‘no revenue can be derived from setting a higher 
price for the tied product which could not have been made by setting the
 96. Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 451. 
97. Id.
 98. Id. at 462–78. 
99. Id. at 462. 
100. Id. at 463. 
101. Id. at 462–63. 
102. Id. at 494 n.2 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
103. Id. 
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optimum price.’”104  According to Justice Scalia, this single monopoly 
profit theorem “strongly suggest[ed] that Kodak parts and the service 
involved in installing them should not be treated as distinct products for 
antitrust tying purposes.”105 
Another disagreement between the majority and the dissenters was 
whether a firm could incur antitrust liability for tying products in a derivative
aftermarket (replacement parts for Kodak photocopiers) when competition
already existed in the primary market for equipment (various brands of 
photocopiers).  The majority rejected Kodak’s claim that competition among 
photocopier manufacturers prevented it from raising prices of services and
parts for its machines. The majority reasoned that, although it was true 
that interbrand competition for photocopiers prevented Kodak from charging 
the full supracompetitive price that it might have wanted to charge for parts
and services, that interbrand competition did not necessarily prevent Kodak
from charging a price that was above the competitive level: “The fact that 
the equipment market imposes a restraint on prices in the aftermarkets
by no means disproves the existence of power in those markets.”106 
The constraint that interbrand competition placed on Kodak’s exploitation 
of intraband market power was, according to the Court, attenuated by 
Kodak’s horizontal relationship with competing providers of repair services.107 
The Court said that high information costs would prevent accurate life-
cycle pricing, and most consumers, the majority feared, would be unable to 
calculate the total cost of equipment, replacement parts, and repair service.108 
Furthermore, the majority said that high switching costs also allowed
Kodak to exploit its customers, for “consumers who already have purchased 
the equipment, and are thus ‘locked in,’ will tolerate some level of service-
price increases before changing equipment brands.”109 
Justice Scalia dissented.  Virtually every manufacturer of a durable 
good, he noted, enjoys some form of market power with respect to unique 
products required for aftermarket support.110  However, he said, lacking 
interbrand market power, a firm could not “raise derivative market prices 
generally by reducing quantity,” because, if Kodak set supracompetitive 
prices for parts or service, consumers would purchase equipment from 
Kodak’s competitors.111  The Court’s concern over high information costs
 104. Id. (quoting PHILLIP AREEDA & LOUIS KAPLOW, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS ¶ 426(a) 
(4th ed. 1988) (quoting Bowman, supra note 45, at 19)). 
105. Id. at 494–95 n.2. 
106. Id. at 471 (majority opinion). 
107. Id. at 471 n.18. 
108. Id. at 473. 
109. Id. at 476. 
110. Id. at 493 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
111. Id. at 495. 
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and switching costs was, in the assessment of the three dissenters,
unfounded; both kinds of transaction costs pervaded real-world markets 
without attracting the concern of antitrust law.112  Consequently, the dissenters
found that “[a] tie between two aftermarket derivatives does next to
nothing to improve a competitive manufacturer’s ability to extract monopoly 
rents from its consumers.”113  Although the majority in Kodak did not label
tying as per se illegal, the dissenters finally argued that applying the per
se rule to single-brand aftermarket tying arrangements would achieve 
nothing more than “releas[ing] a torrent of litigation and a flood of 
commercial intimidation.”114 
Kodak’s definition of tying raised criticism.  Dennis Carlton, Herbert 
Hovenkamp, and other antitrust scholars have criticized Kodak for 
evaluating market power in an aftermarket when the market for the new 
durable product (photocopiers) is competitive.115 
It is important that, in Kodak, the Supreme Court never called tying per 
se illegal. Because the case came to the Court on Kodak’s motion for 
summary judgment,116 the Court did not need to decide whether precompetitive
effects could outweigh the anticompetitive effects of Kodak’s conduct.117 
Nevertheless, the Court’s reference to such balancing suggests an implicit
qualification of tying as an antitrust offense that needs to be assessed
under the rule of reason.118
 112. Id. at 495–98. 
113. Id. at 499. 
114. Id. at 489. 
115. See, e.g., Dennis W. Carlton, A General Analysis of Exclusionary Conduct and
Refusal To Deal—Why Aspen and Kodak Are Misguided, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 659, 679
(2001); Dennis W. Carlton & Michael Waldman, Competition, Monopoly, and Aftermarkets, 
26 J.L. ECON. &  ORG. 54 (2010); Daniel J. Gifford, The Damaging Impact of the Eastman 
Kodak Precedent Upon Product Competition: Antitrust Law in Need of Correction, 72 
WASH. U. L.Q. 1507, 1533 (1994) (arguing that there was no plausible anticompetitive 
reason for Kodak’s tying practice, and that Court should have presumed it was
procompetitive); Herbert Hovenkamp, Market Power in Aftermarkets: Antitrust Policy 
and the Kodak Case, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1447, 1458–59 (1993) (observing low probability
of exploitation in aftermarkets when foremarket is competitive). 
116. Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 456. 
117. Id. at 478. 
118. See id. 
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C. Illinois Tool Works 
In Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc. in 2006, the Court, 
in a unanimous opinion by Justice Stevens (the author of the majority 
opinion in Jefferson Parish), overruled its presumption of market power 
when a firm holds a patent on a tying product.119  The Illinois Tool Works 
opinion praised Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Jefferson Parish and
conspicuously declined to cite Kodak for any proposition.  The Court 
recognized Justice O’Connor, who had retired from the Court two months 
before it issued its opinion in Illinois Tool Works, for having questioned 
in Jefferson Parish 
not only the propriety of treating any tying arrangement as a per se violation of 
the Sherman Act, but also the validity of the presumption that a patent always
gives the patentee significant market power, observing that the presumption was 
actually a product of our patent misuse cases rather than our antitrust
jurisprudence.120 
Justice Stevens wrote that “Justice O’Connor was, of course, correct in
her assertion that the presumption that a patent confers market power 
arose outside the antitrust context,” and he called that presumption “a 
vestige of the Court’s historical distrust of tying arrangements.”121 
The Court in Illinois Tool Works said that “[m]any tying arrangements . . .
are fully consistent with a free, competitive market.”122 The Court found 
it dispositive that Congress had eliminated the statutory presumption in 
patent misuse cases that a patent confers market power.123  The Court held 
that the per se rule should no longer be automatically applied to antitrust
cases of tying arrangements involving patented products.124  The Court  
also rejected Independent Ink’s alternative rule, which would have created
either (1) a rebuttable presumption of market power when tying occurs, or
(2) a presumption in cases where the sale of a patented tying product is 
conditional on the purchase of unpatented goods over time, known as a 
“requirements tie.”125  The Court thus rejected the proposition that
the combination of a patent and a requirements tie were together enough 
to consider the tying arrangement per se unlawful.126  The Court emphasized 
that tying arrangements should raise competitive concerns only “when the
119. Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 31 (2006). 
120. Id. at 37–38 (citing Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 35, 37
n.7 (1984)). 
121. Id. at 38. 
122. Id. at 45. 
123. Id. at 41–42 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5) (2000 & Supp. III 2003)). 
124. Id. at 42. 
125. Id. 44–46. 
126. See id. 
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seller has some special ability—usually called ‘market power’—to force 
a purchaser to do something that he would not do in a competitive 
market . . . .”127  The Court held that the patent owner’s market power 
should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.128 
Illinois Tool Works—through its subsidiary Trident, Inc.—manufactured 
and marketed printing systems, including patented print heads and ink 
containers. Trident also made unpatented, specially designed ink.  It sold 
the printing systems to original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) that
were licensed to incorporate the products into their own printing systems, 
which were themselves sold to companies needing specialized printing 
equipment.  Independent Ink had developed its own ink, which was 
compatible with Trident’s patented printing technologies.129 
After defeating on jurisdictional grounds a patent infringement suit 
brought by Trident, Independent Ink filed a lawsuit seeking a declaratory 
judgment that Trident’s patents were neither valid nor infringed and, further, 
claiming that Trident was engaged in illegal tying and monopolization in 
violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.130  The district court 
granted Trident summary judgment on both the tying and monopolization 
claims.131  The district court rejected the claim that Trident’s patents
meant that Trident “necessarily [had] market power in the market for the 
tying product as a matter of law . . . thereby rendering [the] tying arrangements
per se violations of the antitrust laws.”132  Summary judgment was appropriate, 
the district court held, because Independent Ink presented no other 
evidence regarding the relevant market or Trident’s market power within 
any relevant market.133 
The Federal Circuit reversed the decision, citing International Salt,134 
Loew’s,135 and Jefferson Parish136 for the proposition that possession of a
 127. Id. at 36 (citing Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 13–14
(1984)).
 128. Id. at 42–43, 46. 
129. Id. at 31–32. 
130. Id. at 32. 
131. Indep. Ink, Inc. v. Trident, Inc., 210 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1177 (C.D. Cal. 2002), 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Indep. Ink, Inc. v. Ill. Tool Works, Inc., 396 F.3d 1342
(Fed. Cir. 2005), vacated, 547 U.S. 28 (2006). 
132. Id. at 1159. 
133. Ill. Tool Works, 547 U.S. at 32. 
134. Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947). 
135. United States v. Loew’s Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962). 
136. Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984). 
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patent on the tying product alone justifies a finding of market power over 
the tying product.137  The Federal Circuit signaled to the Supreme Court
that “the ‘fundamental error’ in petitioners’ submission was its disregard 
of ‘the duty of a court of appeals to follow the precedents of the Supreme 
Court until the Court itself chooses to expressly overrule them.’”138 
The Court got the message.  It said in a unanimous opinion that this was 
the “first case since 1947” in which it had reviewed the presumption of
market power resulting from a patent,139 and that its “review [was] informed 
by extensive scholarly comment and a change in position by the administrative 
agencies charged with enforcement of the antitrust laws.”140  The Court
began by reviewing the history of the per se rule outlawing tying 
arrangements under section 1 of the Sherman Act.  It recounted the 
unanimous decision in Fortner II, in which the Court essentially held that 
a plaintiff cannot win a tying claim without proving that the defendant 
possesses market power in the relevant market for the tying product.141 
Further, it addressed the Loew’s decision, where the Court “described the 
rule that a contract to sell a patented product on condition that the 
purchaser buy unpatented goods exclusively from the patentee is a per se 
violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act.”142  In citing Loew’s, however, the
Court emphasized that Loew’s itself is not precedent for the proposition 
that a patent carries with it presumptive market power—Loew’s is simply
precedent for the proposition that a patented tying product may suffice to 
establish market power under the per se rule.143 
The Court then described how the presumption of market power
accompanying a patented product entered antitrust jurisprudence by way
of the patent misuse doctrine.144 Those cases assumed—without analyzing 
market conditions—that “tying the purchase of unpatented goods to the 
137. Indep. Ink, Inc. v. Ill. Tool Works Inc., 396 F.3d 1342, 1354 (Fed Cir. 2005). 
138. Ill. Tool Works, 547 U.S. at 33 (quoting Indep. Ink, Inc., 396 F.3d at 1351). 
139. Id. at 40. 
140. Id. at 33.  The opinion was unanimous among eight Justices. Justice Alito did 
not participate in the case.  Id. at 46. The Senate confirmed him as Associate Justice on 
January 31, 2006, two months after oral arguments in Illinois Tool Works.  David Stout,
Alito Is Sworn In as Justice After 58–42 Vote To Confirm Him, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2006), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/31/politics/politicsspecial1/31cnd-alito.html?_r=0 [http://
perma.cc/G9L9-G4Z7]. 
141. Ill. Tool Works, 547 U.S. at 36; see also U.S. Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., 
Inc., 429 U.S. 610, 620–21 (1977) (“[T]he question is whether the seller has some 
advantage not shared by his competitors in the market for the tying product.  Without any
such advantage differentiating his product from that of his competitors, the seller’s product
does not have the kind of uniqueness considered relevant in prior tying-clause cases.”). 
142. Ill. Tool Works, 547 U.S. at 37. 
143. Id. (“Notably, nothing in our opinion suggested a rebuttable presumption of 
market power applicable to tying arrangements involving a patent on the tying good.”). 
144. Id. at 38–40. 
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sale of a patented good, the patentee was ‘restraining competition.’”145 
The Court’s decision formally importing the patent-as-market-power 
presumption into antitrust law was International Salt.146  The Illinois Tool
Works Court noted that International Salt “clearly shows [that the Court]
accepted the Government’s invitation to import the presumption of market
power in a patented product into our antitrust jurisprudence.”147 
After reciting the historical foundation for the patent-as-market-power 
presumption in detail, the Court described how Congress had been 
“chipping away” at the presumption ever since Fortner—the very decision 
that began the historical discussion.148 In particular, a 1988 amendment to 
the Patent Code ended the presumption of market power in patent misuse 
cases.149  The amendment provided that a patent holder may not be denied
relief because the patent holder has “conditioned . . . the sale of the patented 
product on the . . . purchase of a separate product, unless . . . the patent owner
has market power in the relevant market for the . . . patented product on 
which the . . . sale is conditioned.”150  Although the amendment did not
refer specifically to antitrust law, the Court said that “given the fact that
the patent misuse doctrine provided the basis for the market power
presumption, it would be anomalous to preserve the presumption in antitrust
after Congress has eliminated its foundation.”151  The 1988 amendment to
the Patent Code was dispositive for the Court: “After considering the 
congressional judgment reflected in the 1988 amendment, we conclude 
that tying arrangements involving patented products should be evaluated
under the standards applied in cases like Fortner II and Jefferson Parish 
rather than under the per se rule applied in Morton Salt and Loew’s.”152 
The Court noted that its decision comported “with the vast majority of the 
academic literature on the subject.”153 
Independent Ink, correctly predicting that the Court would abandon the 
market power presumption, argued for two alternative presumptions of 
market power in tying cases involving patents.  The Court rejected both.154
 145. Id. at 38 (citing Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 490 (1942)). 
146. Id. at 38–39 (citing Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947)). 
147. Id. at 39 (citing Int’l Salt, 332 U.S. 392). 
148. Id. at 41 (citing Fortner Enters. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 503 (1969)). 
149. Id. 41–42 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5) (2000 & Supp. III 2003)). 
150. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5). 
151. Ill. Tool Works, 547 U.S. at 42. 
152. Id.
 153. Id. at 43 n.4. 
154. Id. at 44–45. 
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The first theory suggested “a rebuttable presumption that patentees 
possess market power when they condition the purchase of the patented 
product on an agreement to buy unpatented goods exclusively from the 
patentee.”155  The Court, distinguishing the circumstances in Illinois Tool 
Works from those surrounding the opinion rendered in International 
Salt—upon which Independent Ink had relied as an authority—rejected
this theory.156 
Independent Ink’s second theory presumed market power in the case of
“a tying arrangement involving the purchase of unpatented goods over a 
period of time—a so-called ‘requirements tie.’”157  Independent Ink argued 
that such tying is a means for charging large-volume purchasers a higher 
royalty for use of the patent than small purchasers must pay—a form of
discrimination that “‘is strong evidence of market power.’”158  Relying on 
an article by William Baumol and Daniel Swanson, the Court rejected
Independent Ink’s proposition that price discrimination is evidence of 
market power and recognized that price discrimination “also occurs in
fully competitive markets.”159  The Court had just ruled—three paragraphs
earlier—that a patent by itself is an insufficient basis from which to infer
market power,160 and, because price discrimination does not prove the 
existence of market power, the Court was “not persuaded that the combination 
of these two factors should give rise to a presumption of market power
when neither is sufficient to do so standing alone.”161  To the contrary, the
Court said that “the lesson to be learned from International Salt and the 
academic commentary is the same: Many tying arrangements, even those 
involving patents and requirements ties, are fully consistent with a free, 
competitive market.”162 
Following Congress, the antitrust enforcement agencies, and many
economists, the Court held that, “in all cases involving a tying arrangement,
 155. Id. at 43. 
156. Id. at 44 (citing Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 395–96 (1947)). 
157. Id.
 158. Id. (quoting Brief for Respondent at 27, Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 
547 U.S. 28 (2006) (No. 04-1329), 2005 WL 2427645. 
159. Id. at 44–45 (citing William J. Baumol & Daniel G. Swanson, The New 
Economy and Ubiquitous Competitive Price Discrimination: Identifying Defensible Criteria
of Market Power, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 661, 666 (2003)). 
160. To reiterate the point, the Court referenced the guidelines that the Department 
of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission published in 1995 in which the agencies 
announced that, as matter of prosecutorial discretion, they would not follow the patent-as­
market-power presumption. Id. at 45 (citing U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 2.2 (1995),
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.pdf [http://perma.cc/K78G-BHJ7]). 
161. Id.
 162. Id. 
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the plaintiff must prove that the defendant has market power in the tying 
product.”163  Because Independent Ink had not addressed the market 
power issue at trial, the Court reversed the Federal Circuit, vacated the 
judgment, and remanded the case to the district court to determine whether
Illinois Tool Works possessed market power over the tying patented 
product.164 
D. The Implicit Recognition of Efficiencies as an Affirmative Defense 
Although the Supreme Court has not explicitly included efficiency 
justifications in its four-element test applied to tying arrangements, both 
the Court and the lower federal courts have accounted for efficiencies as
an affirmative defense to tying. 
First, the two-products test applied in the per se analysis represented a 
proxy for evaluation of the potential efficiencies of the tying arrangement. 
In Jefferson Parish, the Supreme Court ruled that the question of whether 
two separate goods should be considered an individual product must be 
examined in light of direct and indirect evidence of consumer demand.165 
As explained by the D.C. Circuit, this analysis allows the court to consider—
to a limited extent—the possible efficiencies resulting from the tying 
arrangement.166  Unless the bundle provides some efficiency, consumers
would always buy the two goods separately.  Therefore, if some consumers
prefer to buy the two products as part of a bundle (even in the absence of 
coercion), then the bundling provides some efficiency.  In that case, the 
two goods might be considered an individual product, rather than two 
separate products, for the purpose of the tying analysis, and the per se 
prohibition should not apply.  Similarly, firms without market power would 
not offer the separate products as part of the bundle unless there is an
economic justification for the tying practice. 
This approach has been largely embraced by lower courts, which have 
been prone to make a “‘single product’ disposition of tying claims because 
they saw tying doctrine as over-aggressive, long dispensing with real
market power and effects and often ungenerous toward defenses.”167 For






Id. at 45–46. 
Id. at 46. 
Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 21–22 (1984). 
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 87 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
10 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 45, ¶ 1760c. 
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concluded (in a case that the Supreme Court summarily affirmed) that, if 
it is reasonable for the defendant to sell products only as a bundle, the 
bundle should be considered a single product.168  Jerrold sold cable television 
antenna systems for communities that were too remote to receive over-
the-air television broadcasts.  The district court found that “Jerrold’s policy
of full system sales was a necessary adjunct to its policy of compulsory 
service and was reasonably regarded as a product as long as the conditions
which dictated the use of the service contract continued to exist.”169 
Second, the Supreme Court in Kodak implicitly accepted the possibility
of the application of efficiency defenses in per se tying cases.  In Kodak, 
the Court ruled against Kodak and affirmed the lower courts’ denial of
summary judgment.  The Court noted that Kodak’s conduct “is simply not
one that appears always or almost always to enhance competition, and 
therefore to warrant a legal presumption without any evidence of its actual 
economic impact.”170  However, the Court did not reject the proposition 
that efficiency justifications can save per se unlawful tying. To the contrary, 
the Court recognized that, “[i]n the end, of course, Kodak’s arguments 
may prove to be correct.  It may be that . . . any anticompetitive effects of 
Kodak’s behavior are outweighed by its competitive effects.”171  Because
the record was sparse, the Court left the factual analysis of Kodak’s 
justifications to the trial court.172  Therefore, it is incorrect to infer from
Kodak that current Supreme Court jurisprudence does not recognize an 
efficiency defense for supposedly per se unlawful tying. 




In 2001 in United States v. Microsoft Corp. (Microsoft III), the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, sitting en banc and speaking 
unanimously, abandoned the Supreme Court’s four-part test for tying 
arrangements when analyzing allegations of tying taking the form of 
software integration.173 
168. United States v. Jerrold Elecs. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545, 560 (E.D. Pa. 1960), 
aff’d per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961); see also 10 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 45, 
¶ 1756a. 
169. Jerrold Elecs., 187 F. Supp. at 560. 
170. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 479 (1992). 
171. Id. at 486. 
172. Id. 
173. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 84, 89, 95 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (per
curiam). 
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A. Microsoft II 
The concern with Microsoft’s tying practice first arose in United States 
v. Microsoft Corp. (Microsoft II).174 In 1994, the U.S. Department of
Justice filed a complaint against Microsoft, claiming that the company’s
licensing agreements with OEMs and other related practices were
anticompetitive.  The complaint was accompanied by a proposed consent 
decree intended to regulate practices for which remedies had been 
negotiated between Microsoft and the Department of Justice.  This decree 
included section IV(E), which both Microsoft and the Department
characterized as an “anti-tying” provision.  After entering into the consent 
decree, Microsoft released its new browser, Internet Explorer (IE) 3.0,
when it unveiled Windows 95 in July 1995.  All copies of Windows 95
installed by OEMs included a version of IE.  In early 1998, the Department 
of Justice petitioned the U.S. District Court in Washington, D.C. to hold 
Microsoft in civil contempt for its bundled licensing of its Windows 95
OS and IE 3.0, and to enjoin Microsoft from employing similar agreements 
with respect to any version of IE in the future.  The Department contended
that Microsoft’s licensing practice violated section IV(E)(i) of the 1995 
consent decree by effectively conditioning the license for Windows 95 on 
the license for IE, which, in the government’s view, created a tie-in
between the OS and the Web browser.175  The D.C. Circuit’s decision in 
Microsoft II arose from the appeal of the district court’s preliminary 
injunction that prohibited Microsoft from requiring computer manufacturers 
that were licensed to install the company’s OS software, Windows 95, to 
also secure a license to install Microsoft’s IE.176 
The case or controversy before the D.C. Circuit was not whether 
Microsoft had violated the Sherman Act or section 3 of the Clayton Act. 
Rather, the D.C. Circuit was interpreting section IV(E)(i) of the Justice 
Department’s 1994 consent decree with Microsoft.177  The court was thus
ostensibly interpreting a contractual provision in light of the intentions of
the contracting parties. Nonetheless, it is equally clear that, in interpreting 
what both parties to the consent decree acknowledged to be an “anti­
tying” provision that must be interpreted with “procompetitive goals in
mind,” the D.C. Circuit’s substantive legal and economic reasoning was 
174. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935, 938–41 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
175. Id. at 939. 
176. Id. at 938. 
177. Id. at 939. 
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indistinguishable from the reasoning that it would have applied if deciding 
what constitutes an unlawful tying arrangement under then-current antitrust 
law.178 
The D.C. Circuit turned explicitly to antitrust law and related economic 
principles to resolve the definition of an integrated product. The D.C. 
Circuit made clear that its interpretation of an integrated product reflected
not only the understanding of the parties regarding the consent decree, but 
also that “this understanding is consistent with tying law.”179  Writing for 
the court, Judge Stephen Williams was careful to distinguish the issues 
relevant to software integration and the “separate consumer demand” 
standard used by the Supreme Court in Jefferson Parish and Kodak, and
he questioned the applicability of the Kodak rule of “separate consumer
demand” to technological tying.  Judge Williams said that an “integrated 
product” is “most reasonably understood as a product that combines
functionalities, which may also be marketed separately and operated
together, in a way that offers advantages unavailable if the functionalities 
are bought separately and combined by the purchaser.”180  Judge Williams 
stressed that the proper “analysis does not require a court to find that an
integrated product is superior to its stand-alone rivals.”181  “The question,”
Judge Williams concluded, “is not whether the integration is a net plus but 
merely whether there is a plausible claim that it brings some advantage.”182 
Applying its product integration rule to the facts before it in Microsoft 
II, the D.C. Circuit found that Microsoft “met the burden of ascribing 
facially plausible benefits to its integrated design as compared to an OS
combined with a stand-alone browser such as Netscape’s Navigator.”183
 178. Id. at 946. 
179. Id. at 950. 
180. Id. at 948. 
181. Id. at 950; see also ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 
458 F. Supp. 423, 439 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (“Where there is a difference of opinion as to the 
advantages of two alternatives which can both be defended from an engineering 
standpoint, the court will not allow itself to be enmeshed ‘in a technical inquiry into the 
justifiability of product innovations.’” (quoting Response of Carolina, Inc. v. Leasco
Response, Inc., 537 F.2d 1307, 1330 (5th Cir. 1976))), aff’d per curiam sub nom. Memorex
Corp. v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980)). 
182. Microsoft, 147 F.3d at 950 (second emphasis added). 
183. 	Id. The D.C. Circuit explained: 
Incorporating browsing functionality into the operating system allows applications 
to avail themselves of that functionality without starting up a separate browser 
application.  Further, components of IE 3.0 and even more IE 4—especially the 
HTML reader—provide system services not directly related to Web browsing, 
enhancing the functionality of a wide variety of applications.  Finally, IE 4
technologies are used to upgrade some aspects of the operating system unrelated 
to Web browsing.  For example, they are used to let users customize their “Start” 
menus, making favored applications more readily available.  They also make
648 
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Judge Williams wrote that “‘a broad injunction against such behavior 
generally would not be consistent with the public interest.’”184 
B. Microsoft III 
Microsoft II supplied the intellectual foundation for formally extending 
to software integration a more deferential antitrust rule for product 
integration than courts had traditionally applied to tying arrangements in 
technologically mature markets.  In 1998, the Department of Justice and, 
separately, a group of twenty states and the District of Columbia filed civil 
lawsuits against Microsoft asserting multiple violations of federal antitrust 
law.185  The complaint alleged that Microsoft purposefully engaged in a
series of actions designed to preserve a monopoly in the personal
computer OS market and to extend that monopoly to the Internet browser 
market.186 
1. The District Court’s Findings of Fact 
Following a lengthy bench trial, Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson, in 
November 1999, issued findings of fact that overwhelmingly accepted the 
factual allegations against Microsoft.187  Judge Jackson concluded, as the
Department of Justice had contended, that Microsoft perceived the
emergence of cross-platform middleware—and particularly of Netscape’s 
Navigator browser—as a threat to its monopoly in the PC operating
systems market.188  Judge Jackson found that Microsoft feared technologies 
such as Netscape, because those technologies could run on multiple 
possible “thumbnail” previews of files on the computer’s hard drive, using the 
HTML reader to display a richer view of the files’ contents.
Id. at 950–51 (citation omitted). 
184. Id. at 951 (quoting 59 Fed. Reg. 59,426, 59,428 (Nov. 17, 1994) (relating to the 
Department of Justice discussion of public comments submitted in the Tunney Act proceeding 
concerning the 1994 consent decree with Microsoft)). 
185. Complaint, United States v. Microsoft Corp., (D.D.C. May 18, 1998) (No. 98­
1232), 1998 WL 35241886 [hereinafter DOJ Microsoft Complaint]; Complaint, State of 
New York ex. rel. Vacco v. Microsoft Corp. (D.D.C. May 18, 1998) (No. 98-1233) 
[hereinafter State Microsoft Complaint]. 
186. DOJ Microsoft Complaint, supra note 185, paras. 1–38, 53–123; State Microsoft 
Complaint, supra note 185, paras. 9–78; Plaintiffs’ Joint Proposed Conclusions of Law at 
1–2, 2–54, 66–70, United States v. Microsoft Corp. (D.D.C. 1999) (Nos. 98-1232, 98­
1233).
 187. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999). 
188. Id. at 27–31. 
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operating systems—hence the denomination “cross-platform”—and they 
exposed their own application programming interfaces (APIs) on which
software developers could rely in lieu of the APIs exposed in the
underlying OS.189  If middleware programs became widely used, then 
large numbers of software developers would have sufficient incentive to 
write applications that relied entirely on middleware APIs, and developers 
and consumers alike would no longer rely on Windows as an applications 
platform.  In Judge Jackson’s view, Microsoft recognized that, if Navigator 
emerged “as the standard software employed to browse the Web,” then 
large numbers of developers would write software applications that ran on 
its APIs and Navigator could thereby erode the applications barrier to 
entry in the PC OS.190 
Accordingly, Microsoft sought to prevent Navigator from becoming the 
standard by maximizing IE’s market share at “Navigator’s expense.”191 
Judge Jackson found that, despite Microsoft’s large investment in IE and 
the potential to obtain significant revenues from its sale, Microsoft 
integrated IE with Windows OS and offered IE for free.192  Judge Jackson 
conceded that Microsoft might have given IE away for free to respond to 
competition rather than to preserve the applications barrier to entry.193  He
concluded, however, that Microsoft’s determination to preserve that barrier 
“was the main force driving its decision to price the product at zero.”194 
Judge Jackson also concluded that Microsoft foreclosed the OEM distribution 
channel to Navigator by prohibiting OEMs from removing IE from Windows 
or from altering or customizing the Windows boot-up sequence.195 Judge 
Jackson found that Microsoft reasoned correctly that the restriction against
removing IE would deter OEMs from loading Navigator onto their PCs 
because to do so would increase support costs and consumer confusion, 
to the point where OEMs’ profits on the sale of a computer would be
depressed.196 
Judge Jackson concluded that browsers and operating systems were two 
separate products because consumers sought to purchase them separately
and because there was general agreement within the software industry that 
the functionalities provided by these two products were distinct.197  Given
the demonstration by the Department of Justice at trial that IE could be 
189. Id. at 29–30. 
190. Id. at 43. 
191. Id. at 45. 
192. Id. at 44. 
193. Id.
 194. Id.
 195. Id. at 58–59. 
196. Id. at 49–50. 
197. Id. at 48. 
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removed without harming the functionality of Windows, Judge Jackson
found that no technical reason existed for Microsoft to prohibit consumers 
from removing IE from Windows.198  Judge Jackson was not persuaded 
by Microsoft’s arguments regarding the technical virtues of combining IE
and Windows. He concluded that Microsoft integrated browsing-specific 
routines with operating-system routines “to a greater degree than is necessary 
to provide any consumer benefit.”199  Consequently, he concluded that
Microsoft thereby “unjustifiably jeopardized the stability and security of 
the operating system,” not only for consumers who wanted a browser, but
also for consumers who did not.200  He further found that the integration 
of IE and Windows reduced the speed of PCs, a disadvantage for consumers 
who did not want a browser.201  Judge Jackson concluded that Microsoft
integrated IE into Windows not for any procompetitive purpose, but purely
to restrict the distribution of Netscape Navigator and to stop “Navigator
from weakening the applications barrier to entry.”202  He also maintained 
that Microsoft’s actions were profitable only to the extent that they
preserved an applications barrier to entry.203 
2. The D.C. Circuit’s Unanimous En Banc Opinion 
In a unanimous en banc opinion issued per curiam, the D.C. Circuit 
affirmed the finding of unlawful maintenance of monopoly power in the 
market for PC operating systems.204 The D.C. Circuit agreed with Judge
Jackson that the challenged practices had anticompetitive effects and that 
Microsoft had failed to present any valid business justification for the 
practices. The D.C. Circuit concluded that Microsoft’s conduct constituted 
an act of monopolization in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act.205 
However, the D.C. Circuit rejected Judge Jackson’s ruling that Microsoft 
attempted to monopolize the browser market.206  The D.C. Circuit held 
that it was “far too speculative to establish that competing browsers would 
be unable to enter the market, or that Microsoft would have the power to
 198. Id. at 53–55. 
199. Id. at 53. 
200. Id.
 201. Id.
 202. Id. at 49. 
203. Id. at 44–46. 
204. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
205. Id. at 64, 66, 67, 71, 77. 
206. Id. at 46. 
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raise the price of its browser above, or reduce the quality of its browser 
below, the competitive level.”207  In particular, the D.C. Circuit criticized 
Judge Jackson’s failure to explain the presence of relevant barriers to 
entry into the browser market that would enable Microsoft to monopolize 
that market.208 Finally, and of greatest relevance to Google’s bundling of
free mobile apps with Android, the D.C. Circuit reversed and remanded 
Judge Jackson’s determination that Microsoft’s tying of IE to the Windows 
OS constituted a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.209 
The D.C. Circuit first evaluated whether IE and the Windows OS should 
be considered separate products.210  The D.C. Circuit analyzed the approach 
adopted in Jefferson Parish, in which the Supreme Court maintained that 
no tying arrangement can exist unless there is sufficient demand to purchase 
the two products separately.211  In evaluating the existence of consumer
demand for the tied product separate from consumer demand for the tying 
product, the Supreme Court accounted for both direct evidence—consumers’
demand for the individual product—and indirect evidence—firms’ practice 
of offering the two products as a bundle.212  The D.C. Circuit explained 
that “[t]he consumer demand test is a rough proxy for whether a tying 
arrangement may, on balance, be welfare-enhancing, and unsuited to per 
se condemnation.”213  The D.C. Circuit reasoned that “[o]nly when the
efficiencies from bundling are dominated by the benefits to choice 
for enough consumers . . . will we actually observe consumers making 
independent purchases.”214  In other words, consumer demand for the
separate products is “inversely proportional to net efficiencies” of tying.215 
Similarly, the D.C. Circuit observed that firms will offer the two products 
in a bundle “only when the cost savings from joint sale outweigh the value 
consumers place on separate choice.”216  Therefore, “bundling by all
competitive firms implies strong net efficiencies” of the bundling practice.217 
The D.C. Circuit ruled that, when there is no convincing evidence of
separate demand and when other firms engage in the same behavior as the 
207. Id. at 83. 
208. Id. at 82. 
209. Id. at 84. 
210. Id. at 85. 
211. Id. at 85–86. 
212. Id. at 86. 
213. Id. at 87. 
214. Id.
 215. Id. at 87–88. 
216. Id. at 88. 
217. Id. 
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defendant, the tying and the tied product should be declared one single
product, and per se liability should be rejected.218 
Further, the D.C. Circuit questioned the adequacy of the separate-products 
test adopted in Jefferson Parish for scrutinizing product integration in
technologically dynamic markets.219  The court considered Microsoft’s
argument that the integration of IE and Windows was innovative and 
beneficial.  Although the court recognized that Microsoft’s licensing practice 
had failed the efficiency balancing test that the court performed under its 
monopoly maintenance scrutiny, when analyzing whether the licensing
practice allowed Microsoft to maintain monopoly power in the PC operating 
systems market, it noted that the separate-products analysis is a screening 
test and consequently it “is supposed to perform its function as a proxy
without embarking on any direct analysis of efficiency.”220  Accordingly,
the court ruled that there was merit to Microsoft’s argument that “Jefferson 
Parish’s consumer demand test would ‘chill innovation to the detriment 
of consumers by preventing firms from integrating into their products new 
functionality previously provided by standalone products—and hence, by 
definition, subject to separate consumer demand.’”221  The court noted,
however, that the separate-demand analysis might be an inadequate proxy 
for evaluating potentially innovative technological integration.  The court 
observed that backward-looking inquiries into consumer demand and
industry custom—direct and indirect evidence about consumer demand— 
were ill suited to determine the efficiencies arising from “new and innovative
integration.”222  As the court explained, “[t]he direct consumer demand 
test focuses on historic consumer behavior . . . and the indirect industry
custom test looks at firms that, unlike the defendant, may not have integrated 
the tying and tied goods.”223  The D.C. Circuit emphasized that the
consumer demand test might ignore the efficiency benefits that integration 
might bring to consumers.224  The D.C. Circuit accepted Microsoft’s
argument that the integration of IE into Windows was innovative and 
could benefit consumers.225
 218. Id.
 219. Id. at 89. 
220. Id.




 225. See id. 
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Scholars in law and economics have applauded the D.C. Circuit’s
approach to evaluating the existence of separate products.  The Areeda-
Hovenkamp treatise had, in 1999, anticipated this critique of the
separate-products test in the context of software integration.226 
Commenting on the “artificiality of the separate products requirement” in 
Judge Jackson’s decision, the treatise noted that, “for purposes of measuring 
the anticompetitive effects of Microsoft’s bundling practice, it is of little
importance whether the Windows 95 operating platform and the Internet 
browser were once sold separately.”227  I, too, had argued, in anticipation 
of the D.C. Circuit’s 2001 decision in Microsoft, that a more appropriate 
inquiry is whether the offered bundle represents the creation of an entirely
new source of consumer surplus.228  Has an entirely new demand curve
come into existence?  Is this a product for which virtually no demand existed 
a few years earlier?  Will consumers benefit from the product integration? 
The failure to address these questions would condemn tying agreements 
that increase consumer welfare.
Further, the D.C. Circuit considered and rejected the applicability of the
per se rule to software integration. Quoting Jefferson Parish, the D.C.
Circuit recognized that certain tying practices “pose an unacceptable risk
of stifling competition and therefore are unreasonable ‘per se’.”229 
However, it emphasized that “[i]t is only after considerable experience 
with certain business relationships that courts classify them as per se
violations.”230  The D.C. Circuit noted that Microsoft’s licensing practice
was very different from any previous tying case that the Supreme Court 
had heard.231  The D.C. Circuit distinguished software integration cases
from the Supreme Court’s precedents on tying; none of the Court’s decisions
addressed “physically and technologically integrated” products, nor did 
the sellers in those cases argue that tying “improved the value of the tying 
product to users and makers of complementary goods.”232  The D.C. Circuit
determined that judicial experience provided little basis for concluding 
that “a software firm’s decisions to sell multiple functionalities as a package
should be ‘conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal 
226. See, e.g., 10 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 45, ¶ 1746.1a  (2d ed. Supp. 
1999).
 227. Id.
 228. Sidak, supra note 30, at 33–47 (discussing the need for tying analysis to consider
whether the market is technologically dynamic). 
229. Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 89 (quoting Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 
466 U.S. 2, 9 (1984)). 
230. Id. at 84 (quoting Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 
9 (1979)). 
231. Id. at 90.
 232. Id. 
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without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the 
business excuse for their use.’”233 
The D.C. Circuit said that applying the per se rule to software integration
could “produce inaccurate results” and deter “valuable innovation.”234 
First, it reasoned, “the separate-products test is a poor proxy for net efficiency
from newly integrated products.”235  The D.C. Circuit observed that the
use of the rule of reason would instead allow the defendant to demonstrate 
that “an efficiency gain from its ‘tie’ adequately offsets any distortion of 
consumer choice.”236  Second, tying arrangements integrating software 
could create “efficiencies” and procompetitive effects “[neither]
encountered . . . [nor] factored into the per se rule” as decided in previous 
cases.237  Thus, the D.C. Circuit determined that the “wooden application 
of per se rules”238 would be inappropriate in markets with a “pervasively
innovative character.”239  Doing so would elevate the risk of “stunt[ing] 
valuable innovation.”240 
Finally, the D.C. Circuit said that it did not have “enough empirical 
evidence regarding the effect of Microsoft’s practice on the amount of 
consumer surplus created or consumer choice foreclosed by the [software] 
integration . . . to exercise sensible judgment regarding that entire class of
behavior.”241  The court reasoned that it simply did not know enough about 
the impact of Microsoft’s licensing practice on competition to classify it 
as a per se violation.242 
The D.C. Circuit consequently found that “the rule of reason, rather than 
per se analysis, should govern the legality of tying arrangements involving 
platform software products.”243  The D.C. Circuit said that a court applying 
the rule of reason test should focus on whether the integration results in
 233. Id. at 90–91. 
234. Id. at 92.
 235. Id.
 236. Id.
 237. Id. at 93. 
238. Id. at 95. 
239. Id. at 93. 
240. Id. at 92. 
241. Id. at 94.
 242. Id. (quoting White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963)). 
243. Id. at 84. 
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actual harm to competition in the relevant market.244  Antitrust scholars
have endorsed the D.C. Circuit’s reasoning.245 
At the least, the Supreme Court has acquiesced in the D.C. Circuit’s
rule of reason approach to software integration.  Though Microsoft was 
the most consequential antitrust case in a generation, the Court denied
certiorari in the appeal of the D.C. Circuit’s decision.246  More than a  
decade has passed since Microsoft III without the Supreme Court taking a
case to clarify the law.  There is no reason to believe that the Court disagrees
with the D.C. Circuit’s unanimous en banc conclusion that courts should 
evaluate software integration under the rule of reason. 
VI. THE MADA AND GOOGLE’S BUSINESS MODEL 
Google has compelling business justifications to make its apps available 
for preloading only under the conditions specified in the MADA.  The 
MADA’s requirements promote the appeal of Android-operated devices 
that use GMS and thus maintain Android’s competitiveness in the market
for mobile platforms.  The viability of an open platform in turn facilitates 
Google’s participation in the mobile device industry.
A. The Android OS, Google Apps, and the Suite of  

Google Mobile Services 

Google offers a variety of products for mobile devices: the Android OS 
and multiple Google apps,which are available to consumers both separately
and as part of GMS.  Understanding the key features of and the relationship 
between those products is necessary to evaluating the effects that the 
MADA has on competition and, ultimately, consumers. 
244. Id. at 95 (citing Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 29 (1984)); 
see also David A. Heiner, Assessing Tying Claims in the Context of Software Integration: 
A Suggested Framework for Applying the Rule of Reason Analysis, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 123, 
146 (2005) (stating that the rule of reason test must be applied with a “focus on whether 
the integration results in actual harm to competition in the ‘market’ . . . or, conversely,
whether the integrated product . . . preserve[s] competitive opportunities”). 
245. See, e.g., Heiner, supra note 244; Christian Ahlborn, David S. Evans & A. Jorge 
Padilla, The Antitrust Economics of Tying: A Farewell to Per Se Illegality, 49 ANTITRUST
BULL. 287, 301–03 (2004). 
246. Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 534 U.S. 952 (2001) (mem.). 
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1. The Android OS 
Android is a mobile operating system.  It coordinates all hardware and
software functions for mobile devices, such as smartphones and tablets.247 
Android, Inc., a start-up founded in 2003 in Palo Alto, California, initially 
developed Android.248  In 2005, Google acquired Android, Inc. and “set
about the ambitious goal of creating a new mobile operating system that 
would allow open interoperation across carriers and manufacturers.”249 
As a leading member of the Open Handset Alliance (OHA)—a consortium 
of 84 mobile operators, handset manufacturers, semiconductor companies, 
software companies, and commercialization companies committed to
developing open standards for mobile devices—Google was a major
contributor to the initial development and launch of Android.250  As of  
July 2015, Google continues to invest in the development of Android: 
Google leads the Android Open Source Project—“the people, the processes, 
and the source code that make up Android”—overseeing the further
development of the Android OS.251 
Android is an open-source OS offered free of charge.252  Unlike a
closed-source OS, the code of an open-source OS is typically, though not
always, available free of charge to the public—that is, to manufacturers,
mobile carriers, and individual users—to use and distribute on their 
mobile devices.253  These stakeholders may also customize Android’s
 247. Android, the World’s Most Popular Mobile Platform, ANDROID, http://developer. 
android.com/about/android.html [http://perma.cc/3QKE-ZT33] (last visited June 24, 2015). 
248. A Brief History of Android OS, HEATWARE (Apr. 15, 2014) http://www.
heatware.net/linux-unix/brief-history-android/ [http://perma.cc/UXJ2-XBWM]. 
249. Sergey Brin & Larry Page, Founders’ Letter, in Google Inc., 2008 Annual 
Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 13, 2009) [hereinafter Google Founders’ Letter], http://investor. 
google.com/pdf/2008_google_annual_report.pdf [http://perma.cc/UL4R-C8BA].
 250. See OPEN HANDSET ALLIANCE, http://www.openhandsetalliance.com [http:// 
perma.cc/Z5TN-65LP] (last visited Aug. 11, 2015). 
251. See Frequently Asked Questions, ANDROID, https://source.android.com/source/
faqs.html [https://perma.cc/XSX6-LQ9L] (last visited Aug. 11, 2015). 
252. The Android Source Code, ANDROID, http://source.android.com/source/index. 
html [http://perma.cc/2UZ4-RDAM] (last visited June 24, 2015).  But see Katherine Noyes, Is 
Android Open? Not So Much, Study Finds, PCWORLD (Dec. 13, 2011, 12:49 PM),
http://www.pcworld.com/article/246140/is_android_open_not_so_much_study_finds.html
[http://perma.cc/6ZXM-AKQP] (disputing the “openness” of Android). 
253. Apache License, Version 2.0, APACHE SOFTWARE FOUND. (Jan. 2004), http:// 
www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 [http://perma.cc/PK6C-EUKS].
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features to meet their individual needs.254  Further, any developer may 
create mobile apps that run on Android.255 
Google released the Android OS in 2007, and the first Android-operated 
smartphones were launched in 2008.256  Android “rapidly grew in
popularity.”257  According to Google’s 2013 annual report, there were “more 
than a billion Android devices activated globally as of September 2013.”258 
However, because Android is free, Google does not generate any direct 
profit from this widespread use of Android. 
Android is not the only OS available for mobile devices.  Some 
alternative operating systems are proprietary and closed, whereas others 
are open. Furthermore, some proprietary operating systems are available 
on an exclusive basis, while others are freely licensed to any mobile 
device manufacturer.  For example, Apple iOS is a closed and proprietary
OS exclusively available on Apple’s mobile devices, such as the iPhone 
and iPad.259  No other mobile device manufacturer may lawfully install 
iOS on its devices. Similarly, the Blackberry OS, developed by Blackberry 
Ltd. (formerly Research in Motion), is a proprietary OS available only on 
Blackberry devices.260  In contrast, Windows Phone, the OS developed by 
Microsoft, is a closed and proprietary OS that is nevertheless available on
a nonexclusive basis to any manufacturer.261  For example, Samsung offers
 254. Welcome to the Android Open Source Project!, ANDROID, https://source. 
android.com/ [https://perma.cc/V47X-GTTR] (last visited May 28, 2015); see also Rita El
Khoury, How to Customize Everything About Your Android Device, APPSTORM (Apr. 16, 
2013), http://android.appstorm.net/how-to/customization/how-to-customize-everything­
about-your-android-device/ [http://perma.cc/HN6U-AE44] (last visited Aug. 11, 2015); 
Scott Webster, Customize Your Android Home Screen Experience, CNET (May 4, 2015, 
10:23 AM), http://www.cnet.com/news/customize-your-android-home-screen-experience/
[http://perma.cc/EVS8-XXPW]. 
255. Android Lollipop, ANDROID DEVELOPERS, http://developer.android.com/about/
versions/lollipop.html [http://perma.cc/WWB3-2UX3] (last visited Aug. 11, 2015). 
256. Google Founders’ Letter, supra note 249; T-Mobile G1: Full Details of the 
HTC Dream Android Phone, GIZMODO (Sept. 23, 2008, 10:30 AM), http://gizmodo.com/ 
5053264/t-mobile-g1-full-details-of-the-htc-dream-android-phone [http://perma.cc/Z4L9-FLTP].
257. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 872 F. Supp. 2d 974, 978 (N.D. Cal. 2012). 
258. Google Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 3 (Feb. 11, 2014), https://investor. 
google.com/pdf/20131231_google_10K.pdf [https://perma.cc/5FV4-2Q4T]. 
259. Steve Jobs, Thoughts on Flash, APPLE (Apr. 2010), http://www.apple.com/ 
hotnews/thoughts-on-flash/ [http://perma.cc/7F6P-F4YC]. 
260. Vangie Beal, Mobile Operating Systems (Mobile OS) Explained, WEBOPEDIA 
(Aug. 10, 2011), http://webopedia.com/DidYouKnow/Hardware_Software/mobile-operating- 
systems-mobile-os-explained.html [http://perma.cc/4EQA-BDGR]. 
261. Mobile Operating System, MEDIABUZZ, http://www.mediabuzz.com.sg/buzz 
words-aug-10/mobile-operating-system [http://perma.cc/RPU3-A5N9] (last visited Mar. 
17, 2015). 
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devices that rely on the Windows Phone OS.262  Google thus competes
with Apple, Blackberry, Microsoft, and possibly other companies in the 
market for mobile operating systems.
2. Google Apps 
Google develops mobile apps.  Unlike Android, Google’s mobile apps 
are proprietary. Nonetheless, Google makes most of its core apps— 
including Google Search, Google Maps, and YouTube—available to end 
users free of charge. 
Google apps are not only available for a mobile device running on 
Android, but also might be available on a device that runs on another OS. 
For example, most Google apps are available on Apple’s iPhone,which 
operates on iOS. A consumer owning any of those devices may simply 
download Google apps through the app store on his mobile device.  On an
iPhone, a user may download Google’s apps from the Apple App Store. 
On an Android-operated device, the user will generally use Google Play, 
the app store offered by Google.  Of course, to download non-Google apps 
for Android-operated devices, a user may also use alternative app stores,
such as the Opera Mobile Store and Appland.263  This option is generally
not available on a device that relies on a proprietary and closed OS, which 
typically has only one app store available. 
The end user has a variety of apps—not only Google apps—from which 
to choose and download onto his mobile device; some are free, others are 
not.264  In July 2014, Google Play had more than one million apps
available to the end user.265 Examples of popular apps include Facebook, 
262. See Kristin Bent, Samsung Launches First Windows Phone 8 Smartphone, 
Vows Commitment to Microsoft’s OS, CRN (Aug. 30, 2012, 5:07 PM), http://www. 
crn.com/news/mobility/240006556/samsung-launches-first-windows-phone-8-smartphone- 
vows-commitment-to-microsofts-os.htm [http://perma.cc/EF72-QU8F]. 
263. Henrik Lewander, Android Application Stores, GITHUB (Nov. 29, 2013), 
http://github.com/onepf/AppDF/wiki/Android-Application-Stores [http://perma.cc/JW5G-LHC3]. 
264. See, e.g., Apps and Games, MICROSOFT, http://windows.microsoft.com/en­
gb/windows-8/apps#Cat=t1 [http://perma.cc/EN8V-85QP] (last visited Mar. 17, 2015);
iTunes Charts, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/itunes/charts/paid-apps/ [http://perma.cc/
AWS9-QB6W] (last visited Aug. 11, 2015); Top Free in Android Apps, GOOGLE PLAY, 
https://play.google.com/store/apps/collection/topselling_free [https://perma.cc/4W3A-WCV3] 
(last visited Aug. 11, 2015). 
265. See, e.g., Number of Android Applications, APPBRAIN, http://www.appbrain. 
com/stats/number-of-android-apps [http://perma.cc/24EX-8XCH] (last updated Aug. 11, 2015). 
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Pandora Radio, Yahoo Stocks, Instagram, and WhatsApp Messenger.266 
The fact that a consumer has downloaded Google apps onto his device in 
no way precludes the consumer from downloading or using an alternative 
app that provides the same service.  Consumers can easily switch from 
using a Google app to using another app at little or no additional cost. 
Therefore, to remain attractive for consumers, Google must continuously
invest in the development of its mobile apps. 
3. The Google Mobile Services 
GMS is a set of Google apps that one can preload onto a mobile device 
that runs on Android.  GMS includes a variety of Google apps, such as 
Google Maps, YouTube, Gmail, Google Play, and Google Search.267 A 
manufacturer might decide to preload GMS onto a device so that those 
apps are available to the consumer immediately when he takes the device 
out of the box. Google does not charge manufacturers for the right to 
preload GMS. Google nonetheless requires the manufacturer to enter into
a licensing agreement that specifies the conditions for the use of GMS.  I 
analyze those conditions in detail in Part VI.C.268 
Android and GMS are not interdependent.  A manufacturer retains full 
discretion over whether to use Android on a device and, if so, whether to 
also obtain a license to preload GMS on that device.  Google does not 
require that a device running on Android come with GMS preloaded.269 
That is, the manufacturer decides whether or not to obtain a license to 
preload GMS on its Android devices, and the carrier ultimately decides 
whether to preload GMS onto these devices.  Some manufacturers decide 
to use Android but not to obtain a license for GMS.  For example, Amazon
tablets and the Amazon Fire smartphone run on the Android OS but do 
not use GMS.270  Similarly, Nokia X phones operate on Android but are 
266. See, e.g., Apps and Games, supra note 264; iTunes Charts, supra note 264; Top 
Free in Android Apps, supra note 264. 
267. Take Google With You, GOOGLE MOBILE, http://www.google.com/mobile/ 
[http://perma.cc/778E-D6TC] (last visited Aug. 11, 2015). 
268. See infra Part VI.C.
 269. Alfonso Lamadrid, Some Thoughts on the New Anti-Google (Android) Complaint 




W58Q-AL5Z]; see also Set up Your Android for Google Apps, GOOGLE, https://support.google.
com/a/users/answer/1738362?rd=1 [https://perma.cc/L642-4863] (last visited Aug. 11, 2015). 
270. Burrows, supra note 23. 
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not preloaded with GMS. Nokia X phones instead come preloaded with 
other popular apps such as OneDrive and Skype.271 
Furthermore, hundreds of millions of Android phones manufactured by 
companies such as Baidu, Tencent, and Xiaomi are sold in China without 
GMS preloaded.272  Although Android is widespread in China, Chinese
manufacturers of Android devices preload their own browsers, apps, and
app stores.273 
A manufacturer that decides to use Android but not preload GMS may
preload its own core apps or an app suite from another provider than
Google. For example, Yandex, a Russian search and software company, 
unveiled its own mobile app suite in February 2014, which could supplant
Google on some devices, including devices running on Android.274  A
manufacturer of devices operating on Android could decide to preload the 
Yandex mobile suite instead of GMS.  Google thus needs to offer appealing 
apps to persuade manufacturers to preload GMS and not rely on the
manufacturers’ own apps or those developed by Google’s competitors. 
In sum, the use of GMS is voluntary.  A manufacturer will generally 
decide to preload GMS only if it believes that the included apps appeal to 
consumers and will thus increase the value of its mobile device.  To 
stimulate the preloading of GMS, Google hence must offer quality apps 
that are attractive to end-users.
 271. Chris Smith, Nokia X Android Phone Already Hacked to Run Google Apps, Now
and Play Store (Mar. 1, 2014), TECHRADAR, http://www.techradar.com/us/news/phone-and­
communications/mobile-phones/nokia-x-android-phone-already-hacked-to-run-google­
apps-now-and-play-store-1230002 [http://perma.cc/X45R-SYHY]. 
272. Kaylene Hong, Report: China Has 270m Android Users – That’s Nearly 30%
of Global Android Activations to Date, TNW (Nov. 27, 2013, 2:08 PM),  http://thenextweb.
com/asia/2013/11/27/report-china-has-270-million-android-users-nearly-30-of-global­
android-activations-to-date/ [http://perma.cc/S22P-7USU]; Ryan Whitwam, Android Is
Failing by Succeeding in China, EXTREMETECH (Dec. 18, 2012, 9:00 AM), http://www. 
extremetech.com/mobile/143585-android-is-failing-by-succeeding-in-china [http://perma.cc/
HS9B-LTYK]; Baidu Launches Its Own Android-Based Mobile OS in China, Leaves out 
Google Search and Services, 9TO5GOOGLE (Sept. 5, 2011), http://9to5google.com/2011/
09/05/baidu-launches-its-own-android-based-mobile-os-in-china-leaves-out-google-search
-and-services/ [http://perma.cc/9KFT-9F58]. 
273. See, e.g., Baidu Launches Its Own Android-Based Mobile OS in China, Leaves
out Google Search and Services, supra note 272. 
274. Stephen Shankland, Yandex Suite of Free Android Tools Sidesteps Google, 
CNET (Feb. 20, 2014, 4:14 AM), http://www.cnet.com/news/yandex-suite-of-free­
android-tools-sidesteps-google [http://perma.cc/X4NK-N7QN]. 
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B. Google’s Business Model 
Economic analysis of Google’s business model reveals why Google
offers Android, Google apps, and GMS free of charge.  By offering a well-
functioning OS and attractive apps, Google can attract users and, by 
attracting users, promote its mobile advertising business. 
1. How Does Google Monetize Its Free Apps? 
Google operates in a multisided market, which Jean-Charles Rochet and
Jean Tirole define as a market “in which one or several platforms enable 
interactions between end- users, and try to get the two (or multiple) sides 
‘on board’ by appropriately charging each side.”275  Such business models 
are common.  Television networks and newspapers, for example, both 
generate content to appeal to consumers and thus in turn to advertisers 
because of the size of their viewership or readership. A video-game console, 
such as Sony’s PlayStation™ or Microsoft’s Xbox™, must appeal to both 
consumers and video-game developers to succeed in the marketplace.276 
A credit-card issuer such as American Express must persuade consumers 
to use and merchants to accept its credit card for transactions.277  Google’s
market is similarly composed of a multisided platform: one side of 
Google’s market consists of mobile apps users—typically smartphone and 
tablet owners—another side consists of advertisers, and still other sides 
include app developers and mobile device manufacturers.278 
Google charges different prices to parties on the different sides of the 
multisided market.279  Such a pricing strategy is common in a multisided 
market. David Evans and Richard Schmalensee have explained that 
275. Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Two-Sided Markets: A Progress Report, 37
RAND J. ECON. 645, 645 (2006). The seminal article on two-sided markets is William 
Baxter’s study of credit cards. See William F. Baxter, Bank Interchange of Transactional 
Paper: Legal and Economic Perspectives, 26 J.L. & ECON. 541, 548 (1983). 
276. See, e.g., ROBERT W. CRANDALL & J. GREGORY SIDAK, VIDEO GAMES: SERIOUS 
BUSINESS FOR AMERICA’S ECONOMY (2006), https://www.criterioneconomics.com/docs/
sidak-video-games-serious-business-for-americas-economy.pdf [https://perma.cc/QNV7­
8EZS]; André Marchand & Thorsten Hennig-Thurau, Value Creation in the Video Game 
Industry: Industry Economics, Consumer Benefits, and Research Opportunities, 27 
J. INTERACTIVE MARKETING 141, 142 (2013). 
277. See, e.g., James McAndrews & Zhu Wang, The Economics of Two-Sided 
Payment Card Markets: Pricing, Adoption and Usage (Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond,
Working Paper No. 12–06, 2012), http://richmondfed.org/publications/research/working 
_papers/2012/pdf/wp12-06.pdf [http://perma.cc/27XH-3RKR].
 278. See Hal R. Varian, The Economics of Internet Search, 96 RIVISTA DI POLITICA 
ECONOMICA 9, 11–12 (2006) (explaining Google’s market in an article by Google’s chief 
economist).
 279. See, e.g., David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee, The Industrial Organization
of Markets with Two-Sided Platforms, 3 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 151, 156 (2007). 
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“profit-maximizing prices may entail below-cost pricing to one set of
customers over the long run and . . . many two-sided platforms charge one
side prices that are below marginal cost and are in some cases negative.”280 
For example, many periodicals do not collect subscription fees from 
readers but instead rely solely on advertising revenue. Similarly, Google 
offers its mobile apps free of charge but collects fees from advertisers. 
Google’s strategy of offering free apps is intended to attract users on 
the consumer side.281  Some Google apps, such as Google Maps and
YouTube, are particularly popular. Android and non-Android users have 
demonstrated their demand for Google apps by choosing to install them 
even when the apps have not been preloaded on to their devices. For 
example, in May 2014, Google Maps and YouTube were among the thirty 
most downloaded apps by users of Apple’s iOS devices.282  Apple does
not preload GMS.  The usefulness of the services that Google provides 
through its apps contributes to the expansion of Google’s users.283 
As any other advertising business would, Google’s mobile advertising 
benefits from a high number of users. Google provides advertisers with
both the opportunity to reach its vast number of potential consumers and
the ability to target potential customers effectively based on their revealed
interests.284  For example, when a user of a mobile device submits a query 
280. Id. at 151. 
281. See, e.g., Martin Kenney & Bryan Pon, Structuring the Smartphone Industry: 
Is the Mobile Internet OS Platform the Key?, 11 J. INDUS. COMPETITION & TRADE 239, 253 
(2011).  Kenney and Pon explain that Google’s policy of offering Android and Google 
apps for free is a rational business practice, given Google’s business model of selling
search-based advertising:
What Google does care about is ensuring that its ads are served on as many
mobile devices as possible . . . . [I]nstead of relying on Android as a direct 
revenue-generator, Google seems to be currently using it to . . . build the overall 
market for mobile devices. . . . To increase the overall market, it makes sense that 
Google would license Android for free as a way to enable device manufacturers to 
design and build quality smartphones quickly and inexpensively.
Id.
 282. iOS Top App Charts, APP ANNIE (May 1, 2014), http://www.appannie.com/apps/
ios/top/united-states/?device=iphone&date=2014-05-01 [http://perma.cc/4MZC-M6VP]. 
283. Google Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 1, 6 (Feb. 11, 2014), https://investor. 
google.com/pdf/2013_google_annual_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/9XDZ-DX9S] [hereinafter 
2013 Google 10-K] (“We compete to attract and retain users . . . primarily on the basis of 
the relevance and usefulness of our search results and the features, availability, and ease 
of use of our products and services.”). 
284. See Overview, GOOGLE ADWORDS, http://www.google.com/adwords/start [http:// 
perma.cc/GF2V-X5TM] (last visited Aug. 11, 2015). 
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containing a particular keyword on Google Search, Google frequently 
provides an advertisement associated with that keyword.285  When a user 
clicks on the advertisement, the advertiser pays Google a fee.286 In addition 
to deriving this revenue from Google Search, Google hosts advertisements 
on other apps, such as YouTube.287  Thus, certain Google apps enable
Google to generate revenue from advertising.
Advertising revenue allows Google to recoup its investments in the 
development and maintenance of services that it distributes free of charge— 
Android and Google apps, including GMS.288  Further, competition compels
Google to keep improving its apps and services.  If Google’s apps become
less appealing relative to those of its competitors, Google’s user base will
shrink, all other factors held constant, which would impair Google’s
advertising revenue and its profitability as a company.289 
In sum, Google’s practice of offering Android, Google apps, and GMS
free of charge is a rational decision, given Google’s business model.  The 
large number of consumers that Google’s free services attract enables 
Google to generate profit through mobile advertising.  Competition in the 
app market, coupled with low switching costs, continuously compels Google
to offer appealing apps to end-users.  A decreased user base would harm 
Google’s advertising business and consequently reduce its profit. 
2. Why Did Google Enter the OS Business?
Google’s strategy of buying Android in 2005 was a logical consequence 
of the structure of the mobile industry at that time, coupled with Google’s
interest in the mobile device market.  The smartphone represents the 
convergence of personal computing and mobile telephony.  Throughout 
the 2000s, the boundaries between Google’s traditional focus on personal 
285. See How it Works, GOOGLE ADWORDS, http://www.google.com/adwords/start/ 
how-it-works [http://perma.cc/Y6KB-BK5A] (last visited Mar. 14, 2015); Benefits, 
GOOGLE ADWORDS, http://www.google.com/adwords/start/benefits [http://perma.cc/3WTG­
55WT] (last visited Aug. 11, 2015); see also Varian, supra note 278, at 11 (explaining the 
“matchmaker” function of Google).  A number of queries (such as “Ebola” or “Syria”) trigger 
no ads because there is no ad inventory associated with those keywords. 
286. See How It Works, GOOGLE ADWORDS, supra note 285.  For a popular account 
of the early history of Google’s search business, see JOHN BATTELLE, THE SEARCH: HOW
GOOGLE AND ITS RIVALS REWROTE THE RULES OF BUSINESS AND TRANSFORMED OUR 
CULTURE (2005). 
287. See 2013 Google 10-K, supra note 283, at 3–4. 
288. Id. at 9. 
289. Id. at 6, 8–9.
664 














   
   
 











[VOL.52: 619, 2015] Do Free Mobile Apps Harm Consumers? 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
computing and the mobile market eroded, and Google sought to enter the 
mobile business.290 
In the mid-2000s, Google began offering its first mobile apps, including 
Gmail and Calendar.291  However, the existing conditions in the mobile
market did not favor the development of a market for mobile content.  The 
common walled garden business model, in which a firm restricts access 
to users, limited the development of the mobile ecosystem.292  In the early 
2000s, U.S. telecommunications carriers typically kept tight control of
apps and content sales over mobile devices.293  Carriers opposed mobile
features such as Bluetooth and Wi-Fi, which could undermine the carriers’
business.294 Manufacturers, which depended on mobile carriers to sell 
their phones, consequently needed to design devices in line with the
carriers’ requirements.295  Similarly, developers complained that carriers 
did not make available many of the apps expected to attract more app 
consumers.296 As a result, innovation among content providers for mobile
devices was limited.297  The most widely used mobile app was email, but 
290. See, e.g., Thomas W. Hazlett, David Teece & Leonard Waverman, Walled 
Garden Rivalry: The Creation of Mobile Network Ecosystems (George Mason Univ. Law 
& Econ. Research Paper Series, Paper No. 11–50, 2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1963427
[http://perma.cc/Y79S-3N9R]. 
291. See Our History in Depth, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/about/company/ 
history/ [http://perma.cc/9YFZ-YQG5] (last visited Aug. 11, 2015). 
292. Hazlett et al., supra note 290, at 12; Walter S. Mossberg, Wireless Carriers’ 
Veto over How Phones Work Hampers Innovation, ALLTHINGSD (June 2, 2005, 12:01 AM),
http://allthingsd.com/20050602/carriers-veto-hampers-innovation/ [http://perma.cc/3PK9-QYM4].
 293. See, e.g., Matthaus Krzykowski, Carriers Begin to Believe in Data Revenue, as
Android’s Puzzle Pieces Come Together, VENTUREBEAT (Sept. 10, 2008, 10:52 AM), 
http://venturebeat.com/2008/09/10/carriers-begin-to-believe-in-data-revenue-as-androids­
puzzle-pieces-come-together/ [http://perma.cc/23C8-TWZ7]; Timothy Lee, Verizon Wireless
Responds to Competitive Pressures by Promising to Open Its Network, TECHDIRT (Nov. 
27, 2007, 1:12 PM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20071127/130723.shtml [https:// perma.
cc/MV5N-LA4P].
 294. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 293. 
295. See, e.g., Mossberg, supra note 292. 
296. See Katie Fehrenbacher, Are Carriers Killing Mobile Innovation?, GIGAOM 
(Apr. 25, 2007, 12:53 PM), http://gigaom.com/2007/04/25/are-carriers-killing-mobile­
innovation/ [http://perma.cc/5DZT-HNUD]. 
297. See Mohit Agrawal, Marginalization—The Biggest Threat to Carriers, TELECOM 
CIRCLE (Jan. 28, 2009), http://www.telecomcircle.com/2009/01/marginalization-%E2%
80%93-the-biggest-threat-to-carriers// [http://perma.cc/SK65-UMQA]; Mossberg, supra note
292. 
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few entertainment options such as music players or games were available.
Mobile browsers had trouble displaying web pages designed for PCs.298 
At the same time, the market for mobile operating systems was
fragmented, which made it harder for third-party app developers to achieve 
economies of scale in writing mobile apps.  At first, some manufacturers 
attempted to develop an OS available for use by more than one
manufacturer of smartphones. Nokia and Motorola, together with other 
manufacturers, developed the Symbian OS.299  Palm licensed its OS, 
PalmSource, to some manufacturers including Sony and Samsung, and
Microsoft licensed its Windows CE OS.300  Nonetheless, those operating 
systems quickly became proprietary ventures.  Sony Ericsson made proprietary
enhancements, called UIQ, to Symbian, and Nokia made others, called
S60.301  By 2005, the Symbian OS—initially developed by a joint venture
including Nokia, Psion, Motorola, and Ericsson—had fragmented into 
incompatible versions.302  Although at that time Symbian had a fifty-one
percent share in the market for mobile operating systems, apps developed 
for one version of the OS did not always run on another version.303  Palm
reclaimed its right to make proprietary changes to the Palm OS.304  Motorola 
licensed Microsoft’s OS and Symbian but also invested in developing its
own OS based on Linux.305 By 2007, Blackberry and Samsung each used 
its own proprietary OS.306  The fragmentation of operating systems for 
mobile devices further hampered the development of the market for mobile
content.
The situation changed with Apple’s entry into the smartphone business.307 
Apple introduced the first iPhone in June 2007.308  Apple offered an even 
more proprietary system using components of the OS that it had developed 
for its Macintosh (Mac) personal computer and did not make the OS 
298. JOEL WEST & MICHAEL MACE, ENTERING A MATURE INDUSTRY THROUGH 
INNOVATION: APPLE’S IPHONE STRATEGY 17 (2007), http://www2.druid.dk/conferences/view 
paper.php?id=1675&cf=9 [http://perma.cc/58B4-7LSV].
 299. Id. at 16–17. 
300. Id.
 301. Id. at 17. 
302. David Gilson, The History of Symbian’s Secret Fragmentation, ALL ABOUT
SYMBIAN (Mar. 12, 2012, 3:00 PM), http://www.allaboutsymbian.com/features/item/14405
_The_History_of_Symbians_Secret.php [http://perma.cc/872L-N2MC].
303. Sean Michael Kerner, Report: Symbian at a Mobile Loss, INTERNETNEWS.COM 
(Feb. 10, 2006), http://www.internetnews.com/wireless/article.php/3584431 [http://perma.cc/
6U54-3BFZ] (reporting that Symbian had a fifty-one percent market share in 2005, and 
fifty-six percent in 2004). 
304. West & Mace, supra note 298, at 17. 
305. Id.
 306. Id. at 35 tbl.4.
 307. Id. at 2. 
308. Id. 
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available for licensing. Apple also used some of its own Mac software,
such as the media player and the browser.309  The result was a smartphone
that more resembled an appliance than a personal computer.310  From the 
standpoint of app sales, Apple’s App Store was a dramatic and unexpected
advance.311  One year after Apple’s App Store opened in July 2008, 1.5 
billion apps had been downloaded from the Apple App Store for iPhone 
or iPod Touch devices.312 Many third-party developers that sold apps
benefited from Apple’s platform; because apps attracted users, the developers
had some assurance that Apple would manage the platform to support their
products.313  After Apple’s entry into the mobile market, most carriers tried
to offer more apps, but some still restricted the use of apps that would 
cannibalize their core subscription revenues; some carriers limited
developers’ access to the OS source code because of fear of malware.314 
Nonetheless, Apple’s success with its closed model did not give Google 
the opportunity it sought to enter the mobile business.  Apple’s OS was,
and as of 2015 still is proprietary, and Apple did not at first allow third-
party software development for its iPhone—Apple altered this strategy 
after Google released Android, though Apple kept third-party developers 
under tight control.315  As Hazlett, Teece, and Waverman explain, 
“[p]articipating in [Apple’s] ecosystem requires recognizing Apple’s IP 
and abiding by Apple’s rules—access to the Apple App Store requires 
application developers to grant Apple editorial control, including the right 
to disapprove of content.”316  By relying on Apple’s OS, Google would
face the risk that Apple could limit future users’ access to Google’s apps 
and services and thereby constrain Google’s presence in the mobile 
ecosystem.
 309. Id. at 2, 35 tbl. 4.
 310. Id. at 6. 
311. Id. at 8–9. 
312. Mobile Applications Reach New Milestone: TechWatch Alert, ITU NEWS [hereinafter 
ITU Milestone], http://www.itu.int/net/itunews/issues/2009/06/04.aspx [http://perma.cc/ 
TJY4-VWUZ] (last visited Aug. 11, 2015) (describing new app stores and carrier reluctance
to allow apps for instant messaging and voice over Internet protocol (VoIP)). 
313. Id.
 314. Id.
 315. See Rob Pegorano, Apple Irks iPhone Developers with App Store Restrictions, 
WASH. POST (Sept. 29, 2008), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/fasterforward/2008/09/ 
apple_irks_iphone_developers_w.html [http://perma.cc/MHU8-3QDE].
316. Hazlett et al., supra note 290, at 9. 
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Apple’s rapid gains in market share for mobile operating systems 
spurred others in the mobile market to seek an alternative platform.317 
However, other OS platforms remained fragmented after Apple’s entry.318 
Nokia struggled to commit to a consistent system for licensing Symbian, 
and other phone makers were concerned that Nokia would capture most 
of the value created by Symbian.319  Palm’s OS had never attracted enough 
followers to support the development of apps.320  RIM’s OS was proprietary 
and RIM was in large part confined to the enterprise market.321  Many 
mobile phone makers and developers seemed unwilling to depend on
Microsoft’s smartphone OS as a platform owing to Microsoft’s history of
capturing so much of the value from its Windows platform for personal 
computers.322  Under these circumstances, it was difficult for Google to 
improve its position in the mobile device business. 
Google’s development of Android provided an alternative solution to 
mobile platforms and preluded fast innovation cycles.323  Android offered 
an open platform that enabled app developers and online service providers,
including Google, to distribute their apps and services outside walled
gardens or proprietary operating systems.  With the availability of Android,
Google could focus on developing mobile apps and services, without the 
concern that users would be cut from accessing Google’s services by 
platform owners.  The launch of Android provided Google the opportunity 
it sought to enter the mobile business. Moreover, it provided app developers,
device manufacturers, and end-users with a window for feedback, which 
resulted in fast innovation cycles for Android OS. 
317. Brad Stone & Miguel Helft, Apple’s Spat with Google Is Getting Personal, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 13, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/14/technology/14brawl.html?
pagewanted=all [http://perma.cc/W7GD-8PZW]. 
318. ITU Milestone, supra note 312 (“[A]s more smartphones are sold, the creation 
of mobile applications to run on them is constrained by the fragmentation of the market 
between different platforms.”); Victoria Ho, Mobile Interoperability To Remain Pipe 
Dream, ZDNET (June 23, 2009, 11:29 AM), http://www.zdnet.com/mobile-interoperability-to­
remain-pipe-dream-2062055375/ [http://perma.cc/6JZE-4C7W]. 
319. See Kenney & Pon, supra note 281, at 251. 
320. Id. at 250–51. 
321. Timothy B. Lee, What Killed Blackberry? Employees Started Buying Their 
Own Devices, WASH. POST (Sept. 20, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the­
switch/wp/2013/09/20/what-killed-blackberry-employees-started-buying-their-own-devices/
[http://perma.cc/WH3T-TW5X]; BlackBerry OS, GSM Arena, http://www.gsmarena.com/ 
glossary.php3?term=bb-os [http://perma.cc/8ZW6-CR3H] (last visited Aug. 11, 2015). 
322. Hazlett et al., supra note 290, at 11; West & Mace, supra note 298, at 16–17. 
323. Hazlett et al., supra note 290, at 10.  Google typically releases a new Android
OS every six months.  In comparison, Apple releases a new OS only once per year.  Mike 
Isacc, A Deep-Dive Tour of Ice Cream Sandwich with Android’s Chief Engineer, ARS 
TECHNICA (Oct. 21, 2011, 4:58 AM), http://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2011/10/a-deep-dive­
tour-of-ice-cream-sandwich-with-androids-chief-engineer/ [http://perma.cc/E2N2-WZZB]. 
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C. The MADA’s Basic Features 
Device manufacturers who adopt the Android OS can separately and 
optionally choose to obtain a license to preload a suite of proprietary
Google apps on their mobile devices. They may preload these apps free 
of charge, and thus, make them available to consumers at no cost.  Mobile 
carriers ultimately decide which apps to preload on the devices for which 
the manufacturer has obtained a license at no cost.  A manufacturer wishing 
to preload Google’s apps enters into a MADA with Google. Although the 
MADA is typically confidential, examples of these agreements—the MADAs 
into which Google entered with HTC and Samsung, respectively—became 
publicly available during the Oracle v. Google litigation and provide a 
general understanding of the conditions under which Google licenses its 
proprietary mobile apps.324 
First, the MADAs into which Google entered with HTC and Samsung 
specify that if the manufacturer chooses to preload GMS on a device, it 
shall preload the complete GMS suite—with the exception of certain
optional apps—on to the device.325 In the contracts with HTC and Samsung, 
the apps that Google offered together in GMS included Gmail, Google 
Talk, YouTube, Google Maps, Google Calendar, Contact Sync, Android 
Market Client (the predecessor of Google Play), Network Location
Provider, and Google Phone-top Search—the app that provides access to 
Google Search engine.326  In other words, the manufacturer opting to preload 
Google apps offered in GMS may not cherry-pick whatever Google apps
it wishes to preload on to a mobile device.  Rather, Google allows the 
manufacturer to preload Google’s apps on the condition that it preloads 
GMS as defined in the MADA—except for the specified optional apps. 
324. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 872 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D. Cal. 2012); see, e.g., 
Ina Fried, A Look at Google’s Not-Always-Secret Contracts with Android Phone Makers, 
<RE/CODE> (May 3, 2014, 12:25 PM), http://recode.net/2014/05/03/a-look-at-googles-not­
always-secret-contracts-with-android-phone-makers/ [http://perma.cc/DQ8Q-Q2ZU] (describing
the circumstances under which the MADAs were made public). 
325. See, e.g., Mobile Application Distribution Agreement (Android) Between
Google Inc. and HTC Corporation § 2.1 (Jan. 1, 2011) [hereinafter Google-HTC MADA] 
http://www.benedelman.org/docs/htc-mada.pdf [http://perma.cc/8ND2-FZLQ] (discussing 
the terms of the license grant); Mobile Application Distribution Agreement (Android) 
Between Google Inc. and Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. § 2.1. (Jan. 1, 2011) [hereinafter 
Google-Samsung MADA] http://www.benedelman.org/docs/samsung-mada.pdf [http://perma. 
cc/EEH7-N48W].  See also id. § 1.15 (listing Orkut, Google Goggles, Google Earth, Finance,
News & Weather, Google Buzz, and Google Voice as optional Google applications). 
326. See, e.g., Google-HTC MADA, supra note 325, § 1.11. 
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Second, the MADAs entered with HTC and Samsung allow the 
manufacturer to decide on which devices it chooses to preload GMS.327 
That is, the manufacturer has full discretion to install GMS on all, some,
or none of its devices, leaving it free to decide the volume of devices that
come with or without GMS.328 
Third, both MADAs specify the location of GMS apps on the mobile
device’s screen.  In particular, the MADAs with HTC and Samsung
specify that Google Phone-top Search and the Android Market Client Icon
shall be placed “at least on the panel immediately adjacent to the Default
Home Screen”329—that is, the screen adjacent to the screen that appears 
before the user scrolls to the home screen in any direction.330  All other
Google apps of GMS shall appear no more than one level below the 
“Phone-top,”331 which is defined to be the top-most level of screen from
which the user can launch apps.332  In addition, the manufacturer shall set 
Google Phone-top Search as the default search provider for all web search
points on the device.333 
Fourth, a manufacturer wanting to preinstall GMS on its devices shall
make the devices “Android compatible,” which requires that the “final
software build on Devices must pass the Compatibility Test Suite” before 
327. Google-Samsung MADA, supra note 325, § 2.4 (“For the sake of clarity, 
Company has no obligation to install the Google Applications on all of its devices.”). 
328. The MADAs also do not prevent a manufacturer from preloading on the device 
other apps besides GMS.  Google-HTC MADA, supra note 325, § 2.6 (“Open Devices. 
The parties will create an open environment for the Devices by making all Android
Products and Android Application Programming Interfaces available and open on the 
Devices and will take no action to limit or restrict the Android platform.”).  In other words, 
even if the manufacturer preloads GMS on a device, it remains free to also preload any 
other competitive apps on that device.  See id. §§ 2.6, 3.4; Mike Heuer, Monopoly? Google 
Says App Deals Spur Market, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (July 16, 2014, 5:42 AM), 
http://www.courthousenews.com/2014/07/16/69553.htm [http://perma.cc/TAC7-A3AP] 
(“Manufacturers are free to load rival search engines and other apps . . . .”).  In addition, 
MADAs do not prevent users from downloading competing apps.  To the contrary, the 
inclusion of Google Play in GMS increases the availability of competing apps.  See David
O’Connor, Observations on the Economics of Mobile App Suite Bundling, DISCO (Mar.
3, 2014), http://www.project-disco.org/competition/030314-observations-on-the-economics- 
of-mobile-app-suite-bundling/ [http://perma.cc/43J8-6HPY].
 329. See Google-HTC MADA, supra note 325, § 3.4; Google-Samsung MADA, supra 
note 325, § 3.4. 
330. Google-HTC MADA, supra note 325, § 1.7; Google-Samsung MADA, supra 
note 325, § 1.8. 
331. Google-HTC MADA, supra note 325, § 3.4; Google-Samsung MADA, supra 
note 325, § 3.4. 
332. See Google-HTC MADA, supra note 325, § 1.16. 
333. Id. § 3.4. 
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the device is launched.334  As I discuss later, this aspect of the MADA
aims to prevent platform fragmentation. 
Finally, both MADAs recognize that the “Telecom Operator customer” 
—the carrier, such as AT&T or Verizon Wireless—might impose on a 
manufacturer different requirements with respect to the location of Google 
apps on the phone’s screen than the one specified in the MADA.335  Although 
the MADA acknowledges that such changes are possible, it specifies that
they may be made only with Google’s explicit written approval.336 




Google has three compelling business justifications for offering its free 
apps on the conditions specified in a MADA.  First, the MADA encourages 
manufacturers to prevent Android’s fragmentation. Second, the MADA 
enables Android-operated devices to meet consumer expectations by
ensuring an out of the box experience comparable to the experience that
other mobile devices offer. Third, the MADA’s requirements enable 
Google to counteract free riding and cherry-picking.  Google’s achievement
of these three goals promotes Android’s competitiveness and the availability 
of an open mobile platform that provides Google, and other app developers, 
unrestricted access to the mobile industry. 
1. Countering Intra-Platform Fragmentation 
The MADA between Google and the mobile manufacturer addresses 
the risk of Android’s fragmentation.  Fragmentation occurs when individuals 
modify a platform’s source code to produce multiple versions of the 
platform.337  As other individuals add compounded modifications to these
 334. Id. § 2.7; Google-Samsung MADA, supra note 325, § 2.7. 
335. Google-HTC MADA, supra note 325, § 4.8; Google-Samsung MADA, supra 
note 325, § 4.8. 
336. Google-HTC MADA, supra note 325, § 4.8; Google-Samsung MADA, supra 
note 325, § 4.8. 
337. See, e.g., Mona Erfani Joorabchi, Ali Mesbah & Philippe Krutchen, Real
Challenges in Mobile App Development 3 (2013) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.
ece.ubc.ca/~amesbah/docs/mona-esem13.pdf [http://perma.cc/TR3X-MKL7] (“On the 
same platform, various devices exist with different properties such as memory, CPU speed, 
and graphical resolution. There is also a fragmentation possible on the [OS] level. A 
famous example is the fragmentation on Android devices with different screen sizes and 
resolutions.”). 
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already modified versions, the multiple versions of the platform become 
incompatible.338  As a result, software and apps designed for one version 
of a platform can no longer run on another fragment of the same OS 
platform. Fragmentation is one risk of open-source platforms, such as 
Android.339  Anyone may freely modify and customize the Android OS, but
such modifications and customizations may produce divergences between
different versions of the OS that hinder cross-compatibility between
Android-operated devices.340  The MADAs do not prohibit customization 
by OEMs so long as they do not cause incompatibility.  In other words,
Google’s open-source model permits customization and product differentiation 
with respect to a device’s look and feel, as reflected in the hundreds of 
different Android devices available today.  The MADAs do not bar 
customization; rather, they seek to encourage compatibility.  A closed 
OS does not face similar risks of fragmentation.  Each version of Apple’s 
iOS is practiced only by the iPhone, iPod, and iPad—each of which has 
more uniform hardware specifications and software modifications compared 
with a typical mobile device running on an open-source OS.341  Users and 
manufacturers may not modify the code of iOS.  Consequently, Apple’s
iOS does not face the same risk of fragmentation as Android.342 
Android’s fragmentation would have several negative consequences. 
Fragmentation might cause the malfunctioning of mobile apps and thus 
degrade the quality of the consumer experience.  Fragmentation would
also harm the development of apps for Android-operated devices.  As 
fragmentation worsens, the cost of developing and maintaining apps for 
divergent versions of Android rises.343  If an app could run on only one
 338. See STEVEN WEBER, THE SUCCESS OF OPEN SOURCE 12 (2004). 
339. See Philip Elmer-DeWitt, Fragmentation Blues: Google’s Android vs. Apple’s 
iOS, FORTUNE (Dec. 13, 2013, 4:18 PM), http://fortune.com/2013/12/12/fragmentation­
blues-googles-android-vs-apples-ios/ [http://perma.cc/5YUF-5P79]; Martyn Williams, 
Google Targets Android Fragmentation with Updated Terms for SDK, TECHHIVE (Nov. 
15, 2012, 10:15 AM), http://www.techhive.com/article/2014089/google-targets-android­
fragmentation-with-updated-terms-for-sdk.html [http://perma.cc/A5ZB-KS5D]; see also 
Fabrizio Capobianco, Android: Fragmentation Is Innovation, but It Could Kill You, TV IS 
SOC., AGAIN (Mar. 29, 2010), http://www.fabcapo.com/2010/03/android-fragmentation­
is-innovation-bit.html [http://perma.cc/U8RU-WWEM]. 
340. See, e.g., Licenses, ANDROID, http://source.android.com/source/licenses.html 
[http://perma.cc/KN8R-AKMG] (last visited July 31, 2015); The Open Source Definition 
(Annotated), OPEN SOURCE INITIATIVE, http://opensource.org/osd-annotated [http://perma.cc/ 
55AF-DU4S] (last visited July 31, 2015). 
341. See, e.g., Zach Epstein, Android Fragmentation vs. iOS Fragmentation, BGR 
(Dec. 13, 2013, 12:10 PM), http://bgr.com/2013/12/13/android-fragmentation-vs-ios­
fragmentation [http://perma.cc/335G-6NZG].
 342. Id.
 343. See Philip Elmer-Dewitt, Android Is a Mess, Say Developers, FORTUNE (Apr. 4,
2011, 3:51 PM), http://tech.fortune.cnn.com/2011/04/04/android-is-a-mess-say-developers
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version of Android, the potential user base for that app would be limited
to the users of that specific version.  The limited number of users might 
not provide sufficient economies of scale to motivate developers to create 
apps for Android.344  Consequently, the fragmentation of the Android OS
would jeopardize its appeal to app developers.  The resulting decline in 
the creation of Android apps would in turn threaten Android’s appeal to
consumers, because the availability of a wide variety of apps stimulates 
consumer demand for a particular mobile device.  The demand for Android
devices would fall if all other factors remain constant. 
Google encourages the continued compatibility of different releases of
Android by offering GMS free of charge under the MADA, which in turn 
requires manufacturers to agree to take steps to reduce the risk of 
fragmentation.345  Each mobile device covered by the MADA shall pass a
test for Android compatibility—the Compatibility Testing Suite (CTS).346 
The CTS ensures that a device meets basic specifications to ensure cross-
compatibility across all Android devices.347  In addition, the MADA
requires the manufacturer to avoid an action that might “cause or result in 
the fragmentation of Android.”348  If a manufacturer agrees to make its
devices Android-compatible, Google will allow the manufacturer to preload 
GMS free of charge.  In other words, the MADA provides an incentive 
for manufacturers to take steps that decrease the risk of Android’s
fragmentation. 
[http://perma.cc/JX2E-CEDU]; see also Priya Ganapati, Top Android Champions Fire Back
at Steve Jobs, CNN (Oct. 19, 2010, 5:02 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/TECH/mobile/ 
10/19/android.jobs.response/index.html?_s=PM:TECH [http://perma.cc/LC7N-NQ8U] (quoting
Steve Jobs’ explanation of why developers would prefer iOS to Android: “We also think 
our developers can be more innovative if they can target a singular platform rather than
100 variants.  They can put their time into innovative new features rather than testing on 
hundreds of different handsets . . . .”); Poornima Gupta, Apple’s Schiller Blasts Android,
Samsung on Galaxy’s Eve, REUTERS (Mar. 13, 2013, 8:23 PM), http://www.reuters.com/
article/2013/03/14/us-apple-schiller-idUSBRE92C1FQ20130314 [http://perma.cc/FF5U­
M2C6] (reporting Apple senior vice president of worldwide marketing Phil Schiller’s criticism 
of Android’s fragmentation problem). 
344. See Elmer-Dewitt, supra note 343. 
345. See, e.g., Google-Samsung MADA, supra note 325, § 2.7. 
346. Id.
 347. Android Interfaces, ANDROID, https://source.android.com/devices/ [https://perma.
cc/S3GR-692Z] (last visited Feb. 25, 2015.)
348. Google-Samsung MADA, supra note 325, § 2.2. 
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In sum, the MADA’s requirements help Google to avoid fragmentation 
and thereby maintain the appeal to end users of Android-operated devices 
that use GMS. 
2. Meeting Consumer Expectations 
The MADA’s conditions on distribution of GMS enable Android-
operated devices to meet consumer expectations.  The vast majority of 
mobile devices reach the end user with a set of preinstalled apps that offer 
the consistent out of the box experience that consumers demand.349  The
Windows Phone comes with Office and Bing apps preinstalled on the 
device at no additional charge.350  Apple’s iPhone and iPad come with free
preloaded apps, such as Calendar, Maps, Video, iPhoto, and iTunes.351 
Apple’s decision to offer this set of preinstalled apps at no additional
charge comports with the perception that consumers value a consistent out
of the box experience when purchasing a mobile device. The distinctive 
set of apps preinstalled on each mobile device contributes to a recognizable
out of the box experience that consumers expect when buying the mobile 
device. 
Where a device manufacturer chooses to preload GMS on its Android-
operated device, the MADA’s requirement that the manufacturer preload
all apps in GMS is intended to meet the consumer’s expectation that 
certain functions will be available out of the box.  This requirement
enables Android-operated devices with GMS to offer an experience 
349. See, e.g., Access Yahoo Mail on Mobile Devices, YAHOO!, https://help.yahoo. 
com/kb/mail/access-yahoo-mail-mobile-devices-sln8223.html?impressions=true [https:// 
perma.cc/5FRX-54Q8] (last visited Feb. 25, 2015); Manage Apps: BlackBerry Z10, T­
MOBILE, http://support.t-mobile.com/docs/DOC-6103#preinstalled_apps [http://perma.cc/ 
CAG8-A3XY] (last visited Feb. 25, 2015); Common Questions: Getting Started, HTC, 
http://www.htc.com/us/support/htc-one-vx-att/faq/1/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2015); see also 
O’Connor, supra note 328 (“Google presumably seeks to offer its customers a consistent, 
integrated experience available to users ‘out of the box’ across different Android devices
built by different Android manufacturers.”); What Apps Come with / Are Pre-Installed on 
the iPad?, IPAD GUIDE, http://www.theipadguide.com/faq/what-apps-come-are-pre-installed
-ipad [http://perma.cc/TZR2-4GQL] (last visited Aug. 11, 2015). 
350. What’s New in Windows Phone 8.1, WINDOWS PHONE, http://www.windowsphone. 
com/en-us/how-to/wp8/basics/whats-new-in-windows-phone [http://perma.cc/DNT4-7TK3] 
(last visited Aug. 11, 2015); Mihaita Bamburic, 10 Reasons why You Should Consider Windows
Phone, BETANEWS, http://betanews.com/2013/10/21/10-reasons-why-you-should-consider­
windows-phone/ [http://perma.cc/YQ2C-PNFL] (last visited Aug. 11, 2015). 
351. iPhone 5s, APPLE, https://www.apple.com/iphone-5s/built-in-apps/ [https://perma.cc/ 
6MXR-T686] (last visited Feb. 25, 2015); Apple Makes iWork, iPhoto and iMovie Free 
with New iOS Devices, APPLE INSIDER (Sept. 10, 2013, 10:25 AM), http://appleinsider. 
com/articles/13/09/10/apple-makes-iwork-iphoto-and-imovie-free-with-new-ios-devices 
[http://perma.cc/5PFV-73CT]; What Apps Come with/Are Pre-Installed on the iPad?, supra 
note 349. 
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comparable to the experience provided by devices that rely on other 
operating systems.  The MADA thus ensures that Android-operated devices, 
including GMS, will remain competitive and appealing to consumers.
3. Avoiding Free Riding and Cherry-Picking 
The MADA enables Google to prevent free riding by its competitors. 
Free riding occurs when a firm takes advantage of a product or service 
produced by another firm without compensating the latter firm for the 
costs of providing the product or service.352  When a provider does not
obtain adequate compensation for its product or service because of free 
riding, its incentive to provide that product or service decreases.  The 
Supreme Court has long recognized this principle in its antitrust 
jurisprudence.353  In the economic literature, scholars recognize that the
inability to prevent free riding leads to a socially suboptimal level of
investment.354 
To generate revenues, Google needs to attract consumers.  Google is 
interested in having its apps preloaded on to mobile devices. If a
manufacturer preloads Google’s apps, the apps are exposed to a larger 
number of users.  If those apps are attractive, users are more likely to use 
them, instead of ignoring them, and Google consequently has the potential 
to earn higher revenues.  However, manufacturers will decide to preload 
GMS only if it includes apps that appeal to consumers.  For this reason, 
Google needs to invest in the development and maintenance of apps that 
will appeal to consumers.
The development of appealing apps might nonetheless be costly.  One 
example is Google Play, which did not generate significant revenues in its 
first years.  Google incurred the costs of developing and maintaining the
store, but the store itself did not initially generate significant revenues for 
Google. In 2010, Google projected that the sales revenue generated
through Google Play would be only $14.5 million in 2011, $35.9 million 
in 2012, and $64.8 million in 2013.355  This revenue was divided among 
352. See, e.g., HAL R. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 417 (3d ed. 1992). 
353. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 55 (1977) 
(discussing the free rider problem). 
354. See, e.g., ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 668
(6th ed. 2005). 
355. Google’s Slides on Android Quarterly Report in the Oracle Patent Case, THE 
VERGE (Apr. 25, 2012, 2:40 PM) [hereinafter Google’s Slides], http://www.theverge. 
com/2012/4/25/2974772/googles-slides-on-android-quarterly-report-in-the-oracle-patent­
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different stakeholders, including app developers and carriers, and Google 
reportedly retains about five percent of the generated revenue.356  In  
comparison, Google’s target revenues from the distribution of ads though 
Android were $492.8 million in 2011, $804.3 million in 2012, and $1.27 
billion in 2013.357  Nonetheless, Google’s investments in Google Play made 
economic sense.  A reliable and well-maintained app store is essential to the
performance of the mobile platform and, consequently, to the appeal of
Android-operated devices that use GMS. 
Free riding on Google apps would undermine Google’s ability to recoup 
its investments.  Permitting mobile device manufacturers to cherry-pick 
Google apps—by preloading only those apps from GMS that are not 
monetized and refusing to preload others—would enable the manufacturer 
to attract a larger user base by free riding on preloaded Google apps that 
the manufacturer obtained free of charge.  A competitor that free rides on 
Google apps would undermine Google’s ability to recoup its investments 
and would decrease Google’s incentives to invest in developing and 
maintaining free apps. Consequently, Google might invest a suboptimal 
amount in new product development.358 
The MADA counteracts the free rider problem.  Google’s contractual 
strategy to avoid free riding is familiar and conventional. Vertical
restrictions address free riding by competing producers.359  Producers rely 
on retailers for the distribution of goods and provide those retailers with 
special services that enhance the appeal of those retailers to consumers.
For example, suppose that a producer distributes its product through a 
franchise network.  Besides supplying the franchisee with the product, the 
franchisor typically gives the franchisee equipment, educates the 
case [http://perma.cc/8T3G-9CZU] (showing a slide presentation used as trial exhibit in 
Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., No. 3:10-cv-03561-WHA (N.D. Cal. July 12, 2010)). 
356. Id.  According to Peter Oppenheimer, Apple’s senior vice president and chief 
financial officer, even Apple—which, unlike Google, retains thirty percent of its app 
revenues—runs its App Store “just a little over breakeven.”  Bryan Chaffin, Apple: App Store
Runs Just Above Break Even, MAC OBSERVER (Feb. 23, 2011, 7:04 PM), http://www.
macobserver.com/tmo/article/apple_app_store_runs_just_above_break_even [http://perma.cc/
A5TG-6FAY].
 357. Google’s Slides, supra note 355.
 358. See Ilya R. Segal & Michael D. Whinston, Exclusive Contracts and Protection of
Investments, 31 RAND J. ECON. 603, 619, 628 (2000).  See also Howard P. Marvel, Exclusive 
Dealing, 25 J.L. & ECON. 1, 7–8 (1982) (explaining how a dealer may take advantage of a 
manufacturer’s promotional investment by selling a rival manufacturer’s product). 
359. See, e.g., DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL 
ORGANIZATION 424–25 (4th ed. 2005).  Another way to remedy free riding is vertical 
integration.  Apple, a vertically integrated company, produces an OS, an app store, and 
handsets and operates retail outlets for its products. See, e.g., ATKEARNEY, SMARTER
PHONES, SMARTER MOVES 3 (2012), http://www.atkearney.com/documents/10192/0f76a 
23b-e809-472c-8819-b5676e02d250 [http://perma.cc/4FA8-R54Z].
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franchisee’s personnel, or pays (and provides instructions) for advertising. 
To prevent competing producers from free riding, the franchisor may
require exclusive contracts or preferential placement of the franchisor’s 
products.  The economic literature recognizes the efficiency of such vertical 
restrictions, which increase competition for the distribution channels.360 
Google’s MADA achieves a similar solution.  Without the MADA’s
restrictions, competitors could free ride on the user base that Google had 
attracted by offering free apps.  Handset manufacturers, for example, could
preload only a select subset of non-monetized GMS apps, allowing Google’s
competitors to profit freely from Google’s investment.  The MADA’s 
requirements aim to prevent competitors from free riding on Google’s free 
distribution of its apps. 




Some allege that the MADA’s requirements are unlawful restraints of 
trade. These allegations are not convincing.  The MADA’s requirements 
are lawful under the Supreme Court’s precedents on tying and under the 
D.C. Circuit’s rule of reason analysis for software integration. The MADA’s 
requirements benefit consumers.  The MADA’s requirements do not restrict
competition in general and mobile search. 
A. Allegations that the MADA’s Restrictions Are Unlawful 
In April 2013, FairSearch filed a complaint with the European 
Commission challenging Google’s licensing practice for apps.  FairSearch
reportedly alleged that Google’s practices of offering a bundle of free apps 
and requiring their premium placements on the mobile device screen harm 
competition.  A press release stated:
Android phone makers who want to include must-have Google apps such as
Maps, YouTube or Play are required to pre-load an entire suite of Google mobile 
services and to give them prominent default placement on the phone, the 
complaint says. This disadvantages other providers, and puts Google’s Android
in control of consumer data on a majority of smartphones shipped today.361
 360. See, e.g., Benjamin Klein, Exclusive Dealing as Competition for Distribution 
“on the Merits,” 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 119, 161 (2003). 
361. FairSearch Announces Complaint in EU on Google’s Anti-Competitive Mobile 
Strategy, supra note 12. 
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On April 15, 2015, the European Commission announced that it has 
opened formal proceedings against Google to investigate “if the company’s 
conduct in relation to its Android mobile operating system as well as 
applications and services for smartphones and tablets has breached EU
antitrust rules.”362 
In May 2014, lawyers filed an antitrust class action complaint presenting 
similar arguments before the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of California.363  The complaint—amended in August 2014—alleged that
Google is a monopolist in the “U.S. market for general search” in the United 
States—described as search “on all devices including laptops, desktops, 
mobile phones, and tablets”—as well as “a monopolist in the U.S. market for 
handheld general search.”364  The MADA allegedly allows Google to 
“maintain and extend” its monopoly in the “general search” and “handheld 
general search” markets.365  The plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the complaint 
less than one year after they made their initial allegations.366  The allegations
and main arguments in the amended complaint were as follows. 
First, some apps within GMS, such as YouTube or Google Play, are 
allegedly essential to the marketability of an Android-operated device,
because “customers expect to see these apps on their Android Devices.”367 
If a manufacturer wishes to preload one of the popular Google apps, it can 
preload GMS as a suite of apps under the condition to give specific apps 
premium placement on the device screen. 
Second, “[w]ithout paying Android OS manufacturers for the privilege,” 
Google allegedly uses the MADA to compel manufacturers to confer to 
Google Phone-top Search the position of default search engine.368 The
MADA requires the manufacturer to set Google Phone-top Search “as the 
default search provider for all Web search access points.”369 Obtaining the
default status is allegedly “by far the more cost-efficient and effective way
for any search engine company to distribute its product.”370  Although 
competitors could convince consumers to download the competing search
application on their devices and MADAs facilitate such downloading by
including Google Play in GMS, the persuasion process would allegedly
362. Press Release, Commission Sends Statement of Objections to Google, supra 
note 5.
363. Class Action Complaint, supra note 13, at 1. 
364. First Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 14, at 7–8. 
365. Id. at 4. 
366. Plaintiffs’ Notice of Voluntary Dismissal, supra note 19. 
367. First Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 14, at 3. 
368. Id. at 21. 
369. Id. at 3 (quoting Google-HTC MADA, supra note 325, § 3.4). 
370. Id. at 21. 
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require competitors to “undertake an expensive advertising campaign.”371 
Further, although competitors could educate consumers how to change the 
search engine on their devices, this process allegedly “requires significant 
effort on the part of the consumer,” and most users would allegedly not 
change a device’s default search engine.372  Competitors willing to compete
in the market for mobile search would thus allegedly need to invest
“tremendous resources into marketing and advertising to gain a relatively 
small number of users.”373 
Third, the amended complaint scrutinized Google’s contract with 
Apple—the “largest non-Android phone manufacturer.”374  Under the terms 
of that allegedly exclusionary agreement, Google pays Apple for Google 
“to act as the default search engine on Apple iPhones, iPads, and iPods.”375 
Because the Google Search engine allegedly occupies a key position on 
every mobile device currently available on the market, Google allegedly 
has prevented competitors from entering the handheld search market.376 
By supposedly dictating that the vast majority of mobile device searches 
will use Google’s search engine, the MADAs are allegedly “designed to
maintain and extend Google’s monopolies in general search and handheld 
general search.”377  There is allegedly “no lawful, pro-competitive reason 
for Google to condition licenses to pre-load popular Google apps on making 
its search product the default search engine on covered devices.”378 By
imposing this licensing condition, Google allegedly suppresses competition 
and harms consumers by “robbing” them of choice, reducing innovation, 
and increasing the prices of mobile devices to a level “[higher] than they 
would be if Google did not foreclose competition.”379  Google’s licensing 
practices allegedly exclude actual competition and restrain prospective 
competition in search markets.380  If a manufacturer could choose a default 
search engine for its devices, the amended complaint alleged that the 
quality of Internet search would improve.381  Further, if manufacturers
 371. Id. at 21–23. 
372. Id. at 23. 
373. Id. at 23. 
374. Id. at 20. 
375. Id. at 20. 
376. Id. at 20–21. 
377. Id. at 4. 
378. Id. at 4. 
379. Id. at 29. 
380. Id. at 28. 
381. Id. at 4. 
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were free to choose a default search engine other than Google, Google’s
rivals would allegedly compete for the default status, by “offering to pay 
device manufacturers for that status on various Android smartphones and
tablets.”382  Google’s licensing practices thus allegedly harm consumers 
by inflating prices of mobile devices, which, in the counterfactual world, 
would supposedly decrease due to increased competition for default
engine status.383 
B. The Failure of the Prima Facie Case 
The original antitrust class action complaint against Google alleged that 
the MADA’s requirements establish an unlawful tying arrangement. This 
allegation simplistically assumed the answer to the central question under
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on tying: is GMS a bundle of separate 
products or is it a single product? To presume that GMS is an aggregation 
of separate products is to ignore the dynamic nature of the mobile app 
market. The complainants in the class action case seem to have implicitly
recognized the incredibility of a tying claim, as they abandoned such claim
in their amended complaint. 
Although Google offers its apps individually to end users, the apps 
offered together in a mobile suite may be collectively viewed as a distinct,
individual product.  One can evaluate the question whether GMS constitutes 
an individual product from both demand-side and supply-side perspectives. 
From a demand-side perspective, it is far from clear that GMS is an
aggregation of individual apps rather than a single product. Some
manufacturers of mobile devices might prefer to acquire and preload a 
mobile suite, rather than obtain each app individually, given that licensing 
an entire suite rather than individual apps may significantly decrease
search and transaction costs.384  As I explained earlier, Yandex began offering 
its mobile suite to manufacturers as an alternative to GMS.385  Yandex’s
offer demonstrates that there is demand for a mobile suite as an individual 
product, rather than as separate apps. One could reasonably argue that, 
by offering its apps as part of a suite of apps, Google created an entirely 
new market in which companies compete by offering alternative mobile 
app suites. From this perspective, the mobile app suite is not a suite of 
individual products, but rather a single product.
 382. Id.
 383. Id. at 30. 
384. See, e.g., 9 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 45, ¶ 1703g2 (“[S]elling two
items together can serve the convenience and thus increase the use by consumers or can
reduce their costs or those of the tying defendant . . . . [L]owering costs or raising value 
tends to move . . . use closer to perfectly competitive levels.”). 
385. See supra Part VI.A.3.
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GMS might also be considered a single product from a supply-side 
perspective. A combination of products should be considered a single 
product if it is economically inefficient to sell the combined products 
separately.386  Distributing GMS to manufacturers of mobile devices as a 
suite of apps is central to Google’s business model.  If it did not offer its 
apps as part of a larger whole, Google might not have the economic 
incentive and ability to provide certain mobile apps free of charge.
Development of highly advanced apps such as Google Maps might not be 
cost-justified for Google if it could not combine those apps in a package 
for preinstallation by manufacturers.  Therefore, for purposes of antitrust 
analysis, the efficiencies resulting from Google’s combined offering of
apps in GMS suggest that GMS is a single product rather than a bundle of 
separate products. 
One can reasonably argue that, for antitrust purposes, GMS is an individual 
product. The absence of two distinct products—an essential element of
tying—ends the antitrust inquiry.387 
With respect to the MADA’s requirements, another missing element of 
the prima facie case for per se unlawful tying is the possession of market
power over the tying product.  This proposition might sound surprising, 
given that Google has a commanding position in Internet search.  But the 
pleading requirements in an antitrust case are rigorous,388 and the California
class action complaint did not clearly define what constitutes either the 
tying product or the tied product under the MADA.  The amended complaint 
alleged that Google has market power in handheld search and general
search, but it does not allege that Google Search is the tying product.389 
Rather, the amended complaint alleged that “Google [is] conditioning 
access to their applications on making Google the default search engine.”390 
The amended complaint thus implied that Google ties its search app and 
other less popular apps to two apps—YouTube and Google Play.391 The
amended complaint nonetheless failed to allege, let alone prove, that 
Google possesses market power with respect to the market in which either
 386. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 45, at 168 (“That bundling is required to
sell the items at all certainly proves a single product.”).
 387. See Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 9–18 (1984). 
388. See generally Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (interpreting
the well-pleaded complaint in an antitrust context). 
389. See First Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 14, at 7–8. 
390. Id. at 19. 
391. Id. at 13–15. 
 681 
SIDAK PRINT (DO NOT DELETE) 10/20/2015 2:44 PM 












   
 
    




    
YouTube or Google Play competes.392  The amended complaint merely
alleged that YouTube and Google Play are very “popular Google apps,”393 
but it does not allege that Google has market power over the services 
provided by either of the two apps.394  It is questionable whether Google
in fact has significant market power in the market where those apps 
compete.  An article published in August 2014 in The Wall Street Journal, 
summarizing the results of ComScore’s annual U.S. Mobile App Report, 
reported that the apps more frequently used by consumers are Facebook, 
Pandora Radio, and Instagram.395  Therefore, there is no clear evidence that 
Google has market power in any allegedly tying product market. 
More fundamentally, the whole reason that the possession of market
power is relevant to the prima facie case for per se unlawful tying is 
because the defendant is also alleged to have exploited that market power
through the specific means of forcing the consumer to pay for some other
product that the consumer does not want.396  How, then, as a matter of 
antitrust law is it ever meaningful to say that a consumer has been forced 
to receive for free an extra, convenient feature in a product?  Even the 
consumer who prefers another mobile app is free at all times to take or 
leave the apps included in GMS, just as the sports fan who subscribes to 
the Sunday New York Times is free to keep or discard the New York Times 
Book Review. 
Google’s product integration gives the consumer a real option in the 
precise economic sense of the term, and a real option plainly gives value
to its holder, as is widely understood in the theory of finance.397  Any real 
option subsumes within it the option to decline the offer.398  It would be
frivolous to say that some tenet of antitrust law requires that a consumer 
392. Id.
 393. Id. at 13. 
394. See id. at 3. 
395. Daisuke Wakabayashi, The App Enigma: Users Love ‘Em but They Don’t
Download New Ones, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 22, 2014), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2014/08/ 
22/the-app-enigma-users-love-em-but-they-dont-download-new-ones/?mod=Tech_newsreel_3  
[http://perma.cc/4UVV-LHRF].
396. Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 27 (1984). 
397. For discussions of real options to use assets that embody sunk costs, see 
AVINASH K. DIXIT & ROBERT S. PINDYCK, INVESTMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY 8, 11 (1994); 
Jerry Hausman, Valuing the Effect of Regulation on New Services in Telecommunications, 
in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS 1997, at 1, 27 (Martin 
Neal Baily et al. eds., 1998); Jerry A. Hausman & J. Gregory Sidak, A Consumer-Welfare 
Approach to the Mandatory Unbundling of Telecommunications Networks, 109 YALE L.J.
417, 462–64 (1999). 
398. For a general discussion about real options, see Jerry A. Hausman, Gregory K. 
Leonard & J. Gregory Sidak, Patent Damages and Real Options: How Judicial Characterization 
of Noninfringing Alternatives Reduces Incentives to Innovate, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
825 (2007). 
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have the prerogative to refuse to receive the offer of a free option.  As a 
matter of economic theory, while holding income constant, a consumer’s 
utility cannot be increased by reducing from n to n – 1 the number of 
goods that she may consume.  Moreover, in the case of mobile apps, the 
cost to the consumer of holding that option is essentially zero because the 
storage capacity of the consumer’s mobile device is vast. There is no 
infringement of consumer sovereignty here, let alone one that rises to an 
antitrust concern. 
Nonetheless, assume for the sake of argument that GMS constitutes a 
bundle of separate products and that Google has market power over the 
tying product, neither of which is self-evident from the allegation in the 
California class action litigation. The MADA’s requirements still would 
not constitute unlawful tying under the Supreme Court’s precedent,
because the MADA’s requirements do not harm consumers or the
competitive process.  The amended complaint incorrectly assumed that in 
the but-for world, Google would offer its apps free of charge.  It disregards 
the fact that Google offers to manufacturers its GMS free of charge as 
compensation for choosing Google Search as the default search engine at
certain access points on the device.399  In the absence of such selection, 
Google loses out on a fair chance to monetize its own apps, the development
of which requires significant financial resources.
The MADA’s requirements do not restrict competition among mobile 
operating systems, mobile apps, or in the mobile search market.  To the 
contrary, by increasing Android’s appeal, the MADA’s requirements 
spur, rather than restrict, competition in the mobile OS market.  Therefore,
the MADA does not meet the third requirement of a tying practice: harm 
to competition. 
Google’s licensing practice yields procompetitive benefits for several 
stakeholders of the mobile device industry.  The MADA’s requirements 
enable Android to compete with other mobile operating systems.  The 
increased competition among mobile platforms benefits consumers,
manufacturers of mobile devices, app developers, and advertisers.
Consumers benefit from the lower prices and higher quality of mobile 
devices. Manufacturers benefit from having cheaper and higher quality
mobile operating systems.  App developers benefit, because mobile platforms 
compete to attract app developers by offering more appealing conditions.  
399. Google-Samsung MADA, supra note 325, §§ 2.1, 3.3, 3.4. 
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Advertisers benefit from the large base of users generated by Android’s 
appeal. 
The Supreme Court’s tying jurisprudence indicates that the MADA’s
requirements do not constitute anticompetitive tying. Even if contrary to 
fact Google’s licensing practice were found to reduce competition, the 
MADA’s requirements would still support the affirmative defense of an 
objective business justification because the MADA (1) creates welfare-
enhancing efficiencies for all the market participants and consumers, and
(2) stimulates competition in the mobile OS market.  This conclusion holds a 
fortiori with respect to the rule of reason approach that the D.C. Circuit 
adopted in Microsoft III for software integration.  An affirmative defense 
for software integration applies as much as, or more than, it would under
the Supreme Court’s traditional four-part rule for tying arrangements.  A 
court applying the D.C. Circuit’s rule for software integration would find 
the MADA lawful under the rule of reason. 
C. 	The Benefits to Consumers, Manufacturers of Mobile Devices, and 
App Developers from the MADA’s Requirements 
The MADA’s requirements do not benefit Google alone.  They also
create positive externalities for other stakeholders of the mobile device 
industry.  The MADA’s requirements benefit consumers both directly and 
indirectly by increasing the quality of the experience with Android-
operated devices that use GMS and by increasing competition in the market
for mobile devices.400  At the same time, by maintaining the competitiveness
of Android-operated devices that use GMS, the MADA’s requirements 
benefit manufacturers and app developers.401 
1. Benefits to Consumers 
The MADA provides indirect benefits to the end user.  By maintaining 
Android’s appeal, the MADA stimulates competition in the market for 
mobile operating systems and, consequently, in the market for mobile
devices. When Google introduced Android in 2007, various mobile 
operating systems were available.402  However, none could effectively 
400. See infra text accompanying notes 403–09. 
401. The MADA also benefits advertisers because Google Search “matches people 
who want to buy things to those who want to sell things.”  Varian, supra note 278, at 11. 
The large number of users that Google services can attract enables an advertiser to better 
target the consumers most likely to buy its product. 
402. Industry Leaders Announce Open Platform for Mobile Devices, OPEN HANDSET
ALLIANCE (Nov. 5, 2007), http://www.openhandsetalliance.com/press_110507.html [http://perma. 
cc/2PB5-ABQ2]. 
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compete with Apple’s iOS.  Google created an alternative—a fresh OS 
available free of charge—which soon became a commercially viable 
alternative to iOS. With a free version of the Android OS, the reduced
costs of manufacturing mobile devices enabled manufacturers to lower 
prices on mobile devices and compete effectively against Apple.  Android’s 
introduction generated the entry of lower-end smartphones into a market 
previously occupied solely by feature phones.403  The resulting competition 
in the mobile device market induced manufacturers—like Apple—to
lower prices and increase the pace of innovation.404  By sustaining vigorous
competition in the market for mobile operating systems, the MADA’s 
requirements have indirectly benefited consumers by delivering lower 
prices and increased innovation in the market for mobile devices.
Implicit in the California class action complaint was an assumption that 
consumers tell producers how much integration of software for mobile 
devices is optimal.  More generally, one might ask whether it is consumers
or producers who decide, in the first instance, which goods producers shall 
supply.  The class action complaint presumed that consumers make such 
decisions, and that their evident preference is for less rather than more
product integration.405  There is, however, a strong argument to the contrary
about the revelation of consumer demand.  In 1921, the great University 
of Chicago price theorist Frank Knight argued that producers are better 
able than consumers to anticipate future consumer preferences.  Knight 
posed the problem of revelation of consumer preferences as follows:
The essence of organized economic activity is the production by certain persons 
of goods which will be used to satisfy the wants of other persons.  The first
question which arises then is, which of these groups in any particular case,
 403. Android Pushes Past 80% Market Share While Windows Phone Shipments Leap




404. See, e.g., Tim Bradshaw, Apple Seeks To Fend Off Competition with Cheaper
8Gb iPhone 5c, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2014, 3:18 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ 
82e1f004-aea9-11e3-8e41-00144feab7de.html#axzz3BAmfhbnN [http://perma.cc/3874­
EQF9]; David Goldman, Apple’s Profit Problem, CNN MONEY (Apr. 24, 2013, 12:32 PM),
http://money.cnn.com/2013/04/24/technology/apple-profit-margin/ [http://perma.cc/SZA5­
QQBY]; Trefis Team, Android Pressures Apple on iPhone Pricing, FORBES (Apr. 28, 
2011, 3:31 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2011/04/28/android-pressures­
apple-on-iphone-pricing/ [http://perma.cc/JYB7-U4VY]. 
405. Class Action Complaint, supra note 13, at 29. 
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producers or co
satisfied.406 
nsumers, shall do the foreseeing as to the future wants to be 
Knight did not believe that consumers specify their preferences clearly to 
producers. Rather, he reasoned:
At first sight it would appear that the consumer should be in a better position to
anticipate his own wants than the producer to anticipate them for him, but we 
notice at once that this is not what takes place.  The primary phase of economic 
organization is the production of goods for a general market, not upon direct order
of the consumer.407 
Henry Ford is reputed to have said more simply, “If I had asked people
what they wanted, they would have said faster horses.”408 
When one considers Knight’s insight in the context of a tying rule for 
mobile apps, it becomes increasingly clear that it would harm consumer
welfare for a court to mandate that Google may offer the free suite of GMS 
apps only if it allows other firms in the vertical chain of production to 
disaggregate the suite or select Google mobile apps on an à la carte basis. 
To require Google to do so would thwart its role as the party who
facilitates the revelation of consumer preferences.  It is reasonable to 
expect that the importance of this revelation of preferences increases with 
the extent of technological dynamism in a particular product market. 
When competition exists for the market in a Schumpeterian sense, 
consumer welfare will depend to a greater extent on rivalry with respect
to nonprice variables, such as quality and innovation.409  Competition for
the market is a contest to define entirely new demand curves or to push 
existing demand curves outward with vastly improved combinations of
price and performance. Jefferson Parish’s analysis of the “character of
demand” is uninformative when consumers face products for which they
have newfound and uncertain demand. The revelation of consumer preferences 
is a genuine innovation or discovery, one whose value courts and antitrust 
officials can belittle or ignore only at great peril to consumer welfare. 
2. Benefits to Manufacturers of Mobile Devices 
The MADA’s requirements benefit manufacturers of mobile devices. 
Before Android’s release, a mobile device manufacturer needed either to 
406. FRANK KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 240 (Harper & Row 1965)
(1921).
 407. Id.
 408. See My Customers Would Have Asked for a Faster Horse, QUOTE INVESTIGATOR 
http://quoteinvestigator.com/2011/07/28/ford-faster-horse/ [http://perma.cc/9XP4-DYA9] 
(last visited Aug. 11, 2015). 
409. See Richard Schmalensee, Antitrust Issues in Schumpeterian Industries, 90 AM. 
ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 192, 192 (2000). 
686 


















   
  
  
   
[VOL.52: 619, 2015] Do Free Mobile Apps Harm Consumers? 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
pay a license fee or to incur the cost of developing its own OS and a mobile 
suite of apps.  Both options were relatively costly.410  The MADA provided 
the manufacturer an alternative option: the ability to obtain both the OS 
and GMS free of charge in exchange for promoting Google’s services.411 
The MADA thus enabled the manufacturer to compete effectively with 
vertically integrated mobile device manufacturers, like Apple and Blackberry
without developing its own OS and mobile suite.  Samsung’s experience 
in the market for mobile devices illustrates the positive effects that a 
MADA can have for a manufacturer.  Samsung began producing Android 
phones—including GMS—in 2009, when its smartphone market share 
was only 1.8 percent.412  By June 2013, Samsung’s market share had risen
to 27.7 percent.413  Although other factors surely contributed to Samsung’s
success, its ability to obtain Android and GMS free of charge improved 
the competitiveness of the company’s mobile devices. 
The MADA does not restrict a manufacturer’s choice of OS or mobile 
apps.414  As explained, the manufacturer’s use of Android is not conditional
on its acceptance of the MADA’s requirements.415  A manufacturer is free
to use Android OS without GMS preloaded.  Furthermore, even when a 
manufacturer decides to preload GMS, the MADA does not exclude the 
manufacturer from adopting other operating systems on its other devices, 
because the MADA applies per device and not per platform or product 
model.416  A manufacturer that enters into a MADA can “multi-home”— 
that is, the manufacturer can offer, besides Android-operated devices, 
410. For example, as of 2008, Microsoft charged manufacturers $8 to $15 per device 
for its Windows Mobile OS.  Dave Rosenberg, Windows Mobile Licensing Fees To Remain 
Intact, CNET (Oct. 1, 2008, 5:18 AM), http://www.cnet.com/news/windows-mobile­
licensing-fees-to-remain-intact/ [http://perma.cc/AND9-FC3L].
 411. Google-Samsung MADA, supra note 325, § 2.1. 
412. Gartner Says Worldwide Smartphone Sales Reached Its Lowest Growth Rate 
with 3.7 Per Cent Increase in Fourth Quarter of 2008, GARTNER (Mar. 11, 2009), http:// 
www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/910112 [http://perma.cc/7GZ6-ZGB8]; Sascha Segan, 
Samsung Announces First Android Phone, PCMAG.COM (Apr. 27, 2009, 11:00 AM), 
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2345968,00.asp [http://perma.cc/3Q4B-ERKB].
 413. Josh Beckerman, Apple Keeps U.S. Smartphone Market-Share Lead, but 
Samsung Gains Ground, WALL ST. J. (June 3, 2014, 5:18 PM), http://online.wsj.com/ 
articles/apple-maintains-u-s-smartphone-market-share-lead-but-samsung-gains-ground­
comscore-reports-1401830291 [http://perma.cc/M6J8-YS97]. 
414. Google-Samsung MADA, supra note 325, § 2.4. 
415. Id. § 2.7. 
416. Id. § 2.4 (“Company has no obligation to install the Google Applications on all 
of its devices.”). 
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devices that rely on other operating systems.  For example, HTC offers 
phones running on Android and on Windows Phone.417 Thus, the MADA
does not prevent a manufacturer that wishes to offer Android-operated
devices preloaded with GMS from simultaneously offering devices that 
run on another OS. 
Although the MADA imposes placement requirements on the distribution 
of GMS, the required configuration does not impair a manufacturer’s 
ability to customize the device by preloading other apps.418  A manufacturer
remains free to preload its own apps and third-party apps and place them 
on the home screen, differentiating its devices from others available in the 
market.419  For example, Samsung’s out of the box mobile devices come
with Samsung’s own apps on the default home screen, such as Samsung
Apps—Samsung’s proprietary mobile app store.420  A manufacturer might 
also preload third-party apps.  For example, HTC preloads its phones with
the Dropbox app.421  The MADA does not prevent the manufacturer from
placing those apps in the uppermost location on the mobile device screen. 
Hence, manufacturers are free to preload non-Google apps on their 
devices and place those apps next to Google apps. 
Moreover, carriers have discretion in selecting the apps that are preloaded 
on a mobile device.422  Carriers can, and often do, require the manufacturer 
to preload carrier-specific apps on the mobile device.423  Carriers can also
 417. See Smartphones, HTC, http://www.htc.com/us/smartphones [http://perma.cc/ 
FYK4-SA4B] (last visited Mar, 16, 2015). 
418. Google-Samsung MADA, supra note 325, § 3.4. 
419. See, e.g., App Install Solutions for the World’s Top Device Manufacturers, 
SWEETLABS, http://sweetlabs.com/device-manufacturers [http://perma.cc/E6BJ-REFJ] (last
visited Aug. 11, 2015); Antone Gonsalves, Android Smartphone Makers Are Throwing
You Under the Bus, COMPUTERWORLD (Nov. 6, 2013, 10:11 AM), http://www.computer 
world.com/article/2475389/mobile-security/android-smartphone-makers-are-throwing-you­
under-the-bus.html [http://perma.cc/273C-BQ9Z]. 
420. See, e.g., Steve Litchfield, Review: Samsung Galaxy S4, ANDROID BEAT (May
18, 2013), http://www.androidbeat.com/2013/05/review-samsung-galaxy-s4/ [http://perma.cc/
2N3J-XALE].
 421. HTC Preloads Dropbox on All New Phones To Trump iCloud, MACNN (Oct. 24, 
2011, 4:20 PM), http://www.macnn.com/articles/11/10/24/htc.goes.beyond.rhyme.with.drop
box.plans/ [http://perma.cc/A25U-N9L3].
 422. See, e.g., Tim Kridel, Cracking the Carrier and Vendor Market, DIGITAL 
INNOVATION GAZETTE, http://www.digitalinnovationgazette.com/blog/app_distribution_ 
vendor_preload/#axzz33nw4YkCX [http://perma.cc/GBQ7-3XPP] (last visited Aug. 11, 
2015) (“[H]andset manufacturers don’t control what ultimately remains on the phone.  An
operator may decide to wipe the phone clean of everything except those apps that
specifically fit their goals . . . .”); Mossberg, supra note 292. 
423. See, e.g., How Verizon Preloaded Apps Make Life More Convenient, VERIZON, 
http://www.verizonwireless.com/insiders-guide/network-and-plans/how-verizon-preloaded-
apps-make-life-more-convenient/ [http://perma.cc/8XBW-29YK] (last visited Aug. 11,
2015). 
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require the manufacturer to install third-party apps, along with GMS.424 
Carriers might restrict the location of those apps on the screen of the 
mobile device. 
In sum, a manufacturer using Android is free to decide whether to preload 
GMS or not.  Even when the manufacturer decides to preload GMS, the 
MADA does not limit the manufacturer’s ability to preload its own apps 
or third-party apps on the mobile device and place those apps next to 
Google’s apps. Both the manufacturer and the carrier have an important 
role in determining how mobile apps will ultimately appear on the device.
3. Benefits to App Developers 
The MADA benefits app developers. By promoting Android’s
competitiveness, the MADA fosters the viability of an open distribution 
platform that app developers and online service providers can use as an
alternative to proprietary operating systems. Android’s success stimulated
competition among mobile platforms to attract app developers.  As explained 
in Part III.B, before the introduction of Android-operated devices, few 
mobile apps were available.425 Apple provided third-party developers with 
only a limited opportunity to develop mobile apps.426  Similarly, carriers
limited the role of third-party developers.427  However, the success of Android- 
operated devices has helped change this situation by providing third 
parties greater freedom and a better platform for the development of mobile 
apps.  As a result, a market for mobile apps has arisen, and apps have become
a crucial component of mobile devices.428  As noted earlier, app developers
 424. See, e.g., Kevin Fitchard, Uber Gets Cozy with AT&T, Using Its Network and
Preloading Its App on Android Phones, GIGAOM (May 28, 2014, 3:12 PM), https:// 
gigaom.com/2014/05/28/uber-gets-cozy-with-att-using-its-network-and-preloading-its-app- 
on-android-phones [https://perma.cc/R2F5-QR5M]; Cosmin Vasile, T-Mobile Android 
Devices Now Preloaded with Lookout Security App, SOFTPEDIA (Oct. 25, 2012, 5:01 PM), 
http://news.softpedia.com/news/T-Mobile-Android-Devices-Now-Preloaded-with-Lookout-
Security-App-302194.shtml [http://perma.cc/TKH7-Z6F8]. 
425. See supra Part III.B. 
426. See Chris Ziegler, Apple’s iPhone Lockdown: Apps Must Be Written in One of 
Three Languages, Adobe in the Hurt Locker, ENDGADGET (Apr. 8, 2010, 10:59 PM), 
http://www.engadget.com/2010/04/08/apples-iphone-lockdown-apps-must-be-written-in­
one-of-three-la/ [http://perma.cc/NYY2-XC85].
 427. See, e.g., ITU Milestone, supra note 312 (discussing the restrictions that carriers
place on app development). 
428. See, e.g., Danny Crichton, As Mobile Roars Ahead, It’s Time to Finally Admit 
the Web Is Dying, TECHCRUNCH (May 9, 2014),  http://techcrunch.com/2014/05/09/as-mobile- 
roars-ahead-its-time-to-finally-admit-the-world-wide-web-is-dying/ http://perma.cc/8QXV-
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have an incentive to invest resources to develop apps for a platform when
there is some assurance of compatibility across devices. The MADA 
creates incentives for OEMs to develop compatible devices.  There is now 
robust competition among providers of operating systems, such as Apple 
and Google, to attract app developers to their respective platforms. Each
company strives to make its app development kits more powerful and
accessible to app developers.429  The result is greater competition among
providers of mobile operating systems for app developers.  Competition among 
app developers also increases the quality of apps and thus enhances the 
consumer experience.
The MADA’s requirements do not foreclose competing apps.
Manufacturers and carriers are free to preload other apps on mobile
devices.430  However, one might argue that preferential placement for Google 
apps and the bundling of apps within GMS limit the ability of competitors 
to challenge Google’s apps.  This argument is not persuasive for two reasons. 
First, Google does not have an incentive to harm competition in the 
market for mobile apps.  Google offers products to consumers at a price 
of zero because those consumers will generate revenue for Google through 
the use of these apps.431  Use of Google apps by consumers is necessary 
for Google to remain profitable.  Popular mobile apps have positive 
externalities; the availability of mobile apps will often enhance the 
attractiveness of a mobile device to consumers.  The more attractive the 
apps available on a mobile device, the higher the expected demand for that
particular device.  In other words, Google has a clear interest in allowing third
parties to develop and offer apps that attract a large number of users to 
Android-operated devices. Google consequently has no incentive to foreclose 
competitors from the app market.432 
2NXN]; Ralf-Godron Jahns, 6 Reasons why Mobile Apps Will Become as Important for 
Companies as Corporate Websites, RESEARCH2GUIDANCE (May 17, 2010), http://research2
guidance.com/corporate-app-will-become-as-important-for-companies-as-having-a­
corporate-website-a-look-at-the-german-market/ [http://perma.cc/3U78-VXMA]. 
429. For example, in June 2014, Apple introduced Swift, a new programming
language for iOS applications, which makes it easier to develop applications for iOS devices.
Apple Opens iOS to Third-Party Dev Tools, Reveals Approval Guidelines, APPLEINSIDER 
(Sept. 9, 2010, 5:35 AM), http://appleinsider.com/articles/10/09/09/apple_no_longer_ 
banning_third_party_ios_development_tools [http://perma.cc/YEC7-Y7KN]; Sascha Segan,
Apple’s Swift Language: A Really Big Deal, PCMAG.COM (June 3, 2014, 6:28 PM), http:// 
www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2458939,00.asp [http://perma.cc/K2J8-K22Q].
 430. See supra Part VII.C.2. 
431. Kenney & Pon, supra note 281, at 253. 
432. The importance of a robust mobile apps market increases as a larger portion of
the population turns toward mobile access to the internet.  See MAEVE DUGGAN & AARON 
SMITH, PEW RESEARCH CTR., CELL INTERNET USE 2013, at 2 (2013), http://www.pew 
internet.org/files/old-media//Files/Reports/2013/PIP_CellInternetUse2013.pdf [http://perma.
cc/JU2B-ADHP] (reporting that thirty-four percent of mobile internet users go online
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Second, even if one assumed, contrary to fact, that Google wanted to 
harm competition in the app market, the MADA’s requirements would not 
enable Google to do so.  The primary criticisms of Google’s MADA with
respect to the app market are, first, that it offers its apps combined in a
suite, and, second, that it requires that certain apps be placed on or near 
the home screen.  Neither practice harms competition. 
On an Android-operated device preloaded with GMS, a user can easily 
download additional apps besides those that are part of GMS.  Google 
itself informs a consumer how to download apps and digital content to the 
consumer’s device using the Google Play Store app or the consumer’s 
computer.433  The average smartphone user downloads about twenty-five
apps per device, which confirms that consumers are familiar with the
process of downloading apps.434  Further, a mobile device has enough 
storage capacity for additional apps, even if it comes with preloaded apps. 
The available storage on a mobile device out of the box ultimately
depends on its customization by the manufacturer or carrier, which may
preload other apps and features. For example, the Google Nexus 5 16 GB, 
an Android phone, has 12.28 GB of usable storage space, and the HTC 
Mini 16 GB has 10.44 GB of usable storage space.435  If one assumes that
the average size of each individual Google app is 20 MB—which
significantly exceeds the average app size—then GMS consumes only
0.18 GB of storage.436  Moreover, a consumer can purchase a device with 
mostly using their cellphones); KATHRYN ZICKUHR & AARON SMITH, PEW RESEARCH CTR., 
HOME BROADBAND 2013, at 4 (2013), http://www.pewinternet.org/2013/08/26/home­
broadband-2013/ [http://perma.cc/LKZ8-HDRZ] (reporting that ten percent of Americans 
indicate that they do not have a broadband connection at home but that they do own a 
smartphone).
 433. See Install or Purchase Apps & Digital Content, GOOGLE, https://support.google.
com/googleplay/answer/113409?hl=en&ref_topic=3365058 [https://perma.cc/NL3B-2DER]
(last visited Aug. 11, 2015). 
434. Zoe Fox, The Average Smartphone User Downloads 25 Apps, MASHABLE (Sept. 
5, 2013), http://mashable.com/2013/09/05/most-apps-download-countries/ [http://perma.cc/
CXJ9-5UCY]; Michael H., The Average Global Smartphone User Has Downloaded 26
Apps, PHONEARENA.COM (Sept. 6, 2013, 12:28 AM), http://www.phonearena.com/news/
The-average-global-smartphone-user-has-downloaded-26-apps_id47160 [http://perma.cc/
L96L-26KG]. 
435. Jon Barrow, Phone Storage Compared—Samsung S4 Still in Last Place, WHICH? 
(Jan. 22, 2014), http://blogs.which.co.uk/technology/phones-3/phone-storage-compared­
samsung-s4-still-in-last-place/ [http://perma.cc/2QAQ-J3MN]. 
436. See, e.g., Android Applications: What Is the Size of an Average Android App?, 
QUORA (Aug. 5, 2013), http://www.quora.com/Android-Applications/What-is-the-size­
of-an-average-Android-app [http://perma.cc/B7XJ-GUD9]. 
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a higher or lower storage capacity depending on how many apps the user 
plans to store on the device. Therefore, the preloaded GMS takes only a 
small fraction of the device’s storage capacity, leaving ample storage space 
for the download of other apps. 
Moreover, like Google, third-party app developers can negotiate with a 
manufacturer for the preferential placement of their apps on the screen of 
the mobile device.437  Third-party app developers can achieve a comparable 
agreement with the manufacturer or carrier.  Furthermore, a third-party app 
developer can educate consumers. For example, an app developer can
instruct a user during installation on how best to access the app from the 
home screen, or the app developer can highlight the app’s main features 
to indicate its usefulness over the preinstalled apps in GMS.438  In short, a
MADA does not prevent third-party apps from obtaining a screen placement 
comparable to the one that Google has negotiated. 
Contrary to the argument that the preload of GMS discourages competitors
from paying for the preinstallment of their apps, evidence shows that third 
parties can negotiate with manufacturers or carriers to secure a prominent
position for their apps.  For example, Facebook has negotiated a primary
position of its mobile app on several devices.439 The MADA’s requirements
do not prevent third-party app developers from negotiating conditions
similar to those that Google negotiates within the MADA.
Finally, a third-party app developer can also offer its apps through high 
quality HTML5, the fifth generation of HyperText Markup Language.440 
HTML5 web apps are directly accessible to users through the Internet 
browser, as opposed to native apps that are written for a specific OS to run
 437. See supra Part VII.C.2. 
438. See, e.g., Matt, Add Us to Your Homescreen on Your iOS Device, ARCADE ON 
(May 13, 2013), http://arcade-on.com/news/add-us-to-your-homescreen-on-your-ios-device/
[http://perma.cc/MG7G-REPT]. 
439. Josh Constine, ISA 2011: Sony Ericsson To Preload Its Android Devices with
Facebook Login at Startup, SOCIALTIMES (Jan. 25, 2011, 3:59 PM), http://www.adweek. 
com/socialtimes/sony-ericsson-preload-facebook/255759?red=if [http://perma.cc/J5AH­
PDA3]; Bogdan Petrovan, Facebook Wants to Take Over the Android Homescreen; More 
Manufacturers Incoming, ANDROID AUTHORITY (Mar. 29, 2013), http://www.android 
authority.com/facebook-phone-homescreen-181268/ [http://perma.cc/92G2-UF4P] Chris 
Velazco, Meet the HTC First, The First Android Phone To Come Preloaded with Facebook
Home, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 4, 2013), http://techcrunch.com/2013/04/04/meet-the-htc-first­
the-first-android-smartphone-to-come-preloaded-with-facebook-home/ [http://perma.cc/PGR8-
77PE]. 
440. See Steve Lohr, In a New Web World, No Application Is an Island, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 26, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/27/business/27unboxed.html?_r=2& 
[http://perma.cc/93J4-4WFU]; Matt Marshall, How HTML5 Will Kill the Native App, 
VENTURE BEAT (Apr. 7, 2011, 11:52 AM), http://venturebeat.com/2011/04/07/how-html5­
will-kill-the-native-app/ [http://perma.cc/S78A-4LCW].
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on a device.441 Some expect that, with “constantly improving integration 
with built-in mobile features” and the option of creating a “hybrid app” 
that can be used across operating systems,442 HTML5 web apps—and 
newer versions of web apps—will displace native apps.443  Additionally, a
consumer can place a shortcut icon on her home screen to easily access 
these web-based apps.444  Thus, a third-party developer can also offer a user
the ability to access apps through his Internet browser, instead of downloading
the app on to his device. 
In sum, a manufacturer’s decision to preload GMS does not plausibly 
harm app developers.  Consumers can easily download third-party apps 
and manage their placement on the device’s screen as they prefer.  At the 
same time, if a third-party app developer believes that the placement of its 
app on the device’s screen is essential to attracting the end user’s attention, 
the app developer can negotiate with the manufacturer for premium 
placement of its apps on the device’s screen. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
In 2008, the first Android-operated device came to market.445  Google’s
strategy has been to offer its mobile OS and mobile apps free of charge so 
as to attract a large user base.446 Economic analysis of Google’s business 
model and the characteristics of the mobile device industry confirm that 
Google has valid business justifications for offering GMS under the
conditions specified in the MADA.  Until the launch of Android, carriers 
and platform owners controlled access to the mobile device business. 
With Android, Google provided an alternative mobile distribution platform,
which enabled app developers and online service providers—including 
Google—to distribute their apps and services outside the walled gardens 
441. Lohr, supra note 440. 
442. See Ryan Matzner, Why Web Apps Will Crush Native Apps, MASHABLE (Sept. 
12, 2012, 4:52 PM), http://mashable.com/2012/09/12/web-vs-native-apps/ [http://perma.cc/
BSS4-634E].
 443. Aidan Quilligan, HTML5 vs. Native Mobile Apps: Myths and Misconceptions, 
FORBES (Jan. 23, 2013, 7:55 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ciocentral/2013/01/23/html5
-vs-native-mobile-apps-myths-and-misconceptions/ [http://perma.cc/AT4C-2V2J]; Matzner,
supra note 442. 
444. Brian Williams, Add a Web Shortcut to Android Home Screen, ASK YOUR 
ANDROID (Nov. 29, 2011, 7:13 AM), http://www.askyourandroid.com/android-news/add­
a-web-shortcut-to-android-home-screen/ [http://perma.cc/9LDW-NWHL].
 445. See supra p. 620. 
446. See supra Part VI.B.1.
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of proprietary operating systems.  In a world of closed platforms, Google 
faced the risk that users could be cut off from accessing Google’s apps 
and mobile services.  In contrast, an open platform would permit Google 
—and other app developers and online service providers—to monetize 
their offerings according to their individual business models.  The development 
of the Android OS as an alternative mobile platform was thus an important 
element in Google’s aim to foster its presence in the mobile device business. 
The Supreme Court recognizes that tying arrangements often promote 
competition and benefit consumers.447  Under the Court’s four-part test, 
Google’s combined offering of the apps in GMS is clearly lawful.  Google 
lacks market power in the functions provided by GMS.  Because the apps 
are provided free of charge, one cannot meaningfully argue that offering 
Google apps as part of the GMS suite forces consumers to pay for services 
they do not want.  Google’s free suite of apps benefits both competition 
and consumers.  The D.C. Circuit’s rule of reason analysis of software 
integration specifically recognizes that antitrust law should not discourage 
innovations, including the integration of multiple functionalities into one 
product.
Although EU competition rules differ from those applied in the United 
States, the MADA’s welfare-increasing effects on consumers are the same 
on both sides of the Atlantic.  The MADA’s requirements help Google to 
promote Android’s competitiveness.448  They improve the consumer experience
by reducing the risk of fragmentation of the Android OS.  The MADA’s 
requirements enable Android-operated devices that include GMS to meet
consumer expectations by offering an out of the box experience comparable 
to that offered by devices that rely on closed or proprietary operating 
systems.  And the MADA’s requirements enable Google to avoid free 
riding and cherry-picking, preventing third parties from appropriating the
economic value of the users that Google attracts by distributing free services. 
The MADA thus ensures that Google maintains sufficient incentives to
invest in innovation and provide its services free of charge. 
Far from harming the competitive process, Google’s practice of giving 
away the Android OS and the entire Google Mobile Services suite for
free—and requiring that when manufacturers choose to preload GMS on 
their mobile devices, they pass along the complete suite of apps in GMS
to consumers—has benefited manufacturers of mobile devices and app
developers. It has invigorated competition among mobile platforms and
mobile devices.  Google’s distribution of free mobile apps in GMS has 
produced a market success, not a market failure. 
447. See supra Part IV.
 448. See supra Part VI.D.
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